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Abstract 
The need for substantial investment in the European electricity transmission grid to meet the 
ambitions of market integration and decarbonisation is well known. However, the development of 
these projects has a significant impact on the public at large. As the public becomes increasingly active 
in expressing its concerns and opposition, stakeholder engagement activities to raise awareness and 
build trust in infrastructure development are becoming more and more important, as well as 
challenging. Suboptimal stakeholder engagement by project developers leads to distortion in the 
network planning and development process. Therefore, it is crucial that project promoters are 
encouraged to implement innovative and effective stakeholder engagement strategies, and to reflect 
the outcomes of those activities in the design of the projects. This report re-examines and assesses 
the possibility of enlarging incentive regulation to improve the performance of project promoters in 
building public awareness and trust in infrastructure development projects. The study is structured 
into three blocks:  
1) Taking stock of the obstacles to stakeholder engagement activities and current activities 
organised by project developers.  
2) Innovation in the context of the economic regulation of project developers (TSOs).  
3) Enlarging incentive regulation to, first, include other regulators and, second, to consider 
economic incentives for other stakeholders involved in project development. 
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Executive	summary	
It is well known that there is a need for substantial investment in the European electricity transmission 
grid to meet the ambitions of market integration and decarbonisation. However, the development of 
these projects has a significant impact on the public at large. As the public becomes increasingly active 
in expressing its concerns and opposition, stakeholder engagement activities to raise awareness and 
build trust in infrastructure development are becoming more and more important, as well as 
challenging. 
Suboptimal stakeholder engagement by project developers leads to a short-term distortion of 
infrastructure planning and development; namely, delays of the actual project implementation. 
Although there is limited (publicly available) quantitative data, we may cautiously presume that there 
are financial costs attached to these delays. In addition to the short-term distortion, suboptimal 
stakeholder engagement practices may also lead to long-term distortions in the network planning 
process.  
Considering the resulting distortions, it is crucial that project promoters are encouraged to implement 
innovative and effective stakeholder engagement strategies, and to reflect the outcomes of those 
activities in the design of the projects 
This report re-examines and assesses the possibility of enlarging incentive regulation to improve the 
performance of project promoters in building public awareness and trust in infrastructure 
development projects.  
The methods of analysis used in this research include taking stock of literature from academia and 
industry on current practices for stakeholder engagement. This is complemented with expert 
roundtable discussions on current project developers (TSOs and third-party infrastructure investors) 
practices, their strengths and limitations, and innovative regulatory practices. The results of the study 
are structured as three blocks:  
- Taking stock of the obstacles to engaging in activities for raising public awareness and trust and 
current activities organised by project developers.  
- Innovation in the context of the economic regulation of project developers (TSOs).  
- Enlarging incentive regulation to, first, include other regulators such as other government 
agencies and authorities, public and organised stakeholder groups and independent experts, and, 
second, to consider economic incentives for other stakeholders involved in project development. 
From the insights gained from expert workshops and interviews, it is observed that obstacles for 
effective stakeholder engagement continue to exist. There are three main obstacles:  
- There is limited economic incentives to perform the activities 
- TSOs’ internal procedures, organisation and culture are not fully adapted to the stakeholder 
context.  
- There is an issue with the legitimacy of the TSO to engage in some activities.  
Additionally, TSO resources allocated to public awareness and trust activities are limited. According to 
the survey conducted as part of this research on European electricity TSOs, budgets for this range 
between 1% and 2% of the general expense budget or ‘a few million euros’ and teams were staffed 
with between 3-4 to 40 employees. The limited availability of resources can also be a limiting factor 
for determining the stakeholder engagement activities that are undertaken.  
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Project promoters are increasingly engaging in innovative stakeholder activities. These activities are 
usually a mix of three levels:  
- Corporate level stakeholder engagement  
- Project-level stakeholder engagement  
- Compensation of stakeholders.1 
However, there is a fundamental gap in terms of empirical analysis or assessment regarding the impact 
of such activities. The availability of this information would substantiate the debate and help both 
TSOs and NRAs considering economic incentives for stakeholder engagement activities. This 
information should be made publicly available. Possible variables (See Table I) that could be used for 
conducting such an econometric analysis are conceptually discussed. Furthermore, the limitations of 
such an approach are also presented. Further research on quantifying the impact of stakeholder 
engagement is recommended. It is also recognised that an econometric analysis will take time to 
complete; in the meantime, however, NRAs can take steps based on the other two recommendations 
in this study.  
Table I: Summary of variables that can be used for the econometric analysis 
Independent 
variable 
Company-specific dependent 
variable 
Societal dependent variable  
Budget and Staff 
Media reports 
Stock price 
Brand valuation 
Regulatory asset base 
Congestion management 
Delays 
Project cost 
 
Given that TSOs see financial risk as an obstacle to engaging in more activities to raise public 
awareness and trust, it is recommended to review the economic incentive frameworks proposed by 
the national regulatory authorities and to consider their suitability for dealing with the tasks and costs. 
The three incentive regulations tools studied in this report are:  
- Price or revenue cap regulation  
- Cost-plus regulation  
- Output-based regulation  
Each incentive regulation tool has its pros and cons (See Table II). Furthermore, an interdependence 
exists between the level of sophistication of the regulatory tool and the resource and skills required 
to design and implement it. NRAs have already started to use different combinations of these tools. 
However, it is too early to identify the best approach for stakeholder activities. Some of the more 
innovative incentive regulation approaches appear to be very promising such as in Great Britain. Their 
implementation requires significant regulatory sophistication in terms of NRA resources; therefore, it 
is important to ensure the alignment of regulatory tools utilised and resources available for the NRA 
to administer these tools.  
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Note that compensation can be of a financial nature, involving payments to affected stakeholders, or there can 
be compensation in kind by adjusting the project to create fewer externalities (typically at the expense of a 
higher project construction cost). 
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Table II: Summary of pros and cons of the regulatory approaches from a stakeholder engagement perspective  
 PROs CONs 
Cost-Plus Simple to implement - Information asymmetry between 
TSO and NRA not addressed 
- No incentive for cost control or 
innovation 
- NRA bias towards choosing the 
least controversial stakeholder 
engagement level 
Price/Revenue 
cap 
- Relatively Simple to implement 
- Incentivises cost efficiency 
- No explicit incentive for enabling 
stakeholder engagement activities 
- Company bias towards choosing 
the least controversial stakeholder 
engagement level 
Output (BE/IT) - Incentivises on-time commissioning - No explicit incentive for enabling 
stakeholder engagement activities 
- The challenge of establishing a 
baseline for measuring the delays 
may cause observability issues. 
- The possibility of controllability 
issue as delays may be due to 
several factors 
- Company bias towards choosing 
the least controversial stakeholder 
engagement level 
Output (GB) - The explicit incentive for 
stakeholder engagement 
- (neutral) Expert evaluation 
encourages innovation by reducing 
the level of controversy bias. 
- Evaluation is dependent on the 
quality of external experts 
 
It may be beneficial to enlarge incentive regulation in the context of infrastructure development to 
include other actors with expertise and skills that are not traditionally present within NRAs (or project 
promoters), as regulators. The inclusion of other government authorities can, for instance, help to 
address the legitimacy issue of compensation payments by offering a legal framework for such 
compensations. The public could provide input to NRAs on estimating reasonable costs of stakeholder 
engagement activities such as bypassing a natural area. Independent experts could assist NRAs with 
assessing the performance of project promoters in their field of expertise such as stakeholder 
relations. While these other regulators bring valuable expertise, it is essential that regulatory actions 
are aligned; otherwise, project development might be obstructed rather than facilitated. Incentive 
regulation may be expanded to consider incentives for other stakeholders. Incentives that are directly 
applicable to stakeholders may help them understand the importance of infrastructure projects for 
society. Further research on developing and testing innovative approaches towards enlarging 
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incentive regulation for stakeholder engagement is recommended.  The key conclusions and 
recommendations for future work from this study are summarised below. 
Key conclusions and recommendations for future work. 
Conclusions: 
Conclusion 1: Stakeholder opposition is a pressing problem. Obstacles to effective stakeholder 
engagement and to the implementation of such measures continue to exist.  
Conclusion 2: Project developers are involved in several stakeholder engagement activities; 
however, such stakeholder engagement activities need to be mainstreamed and move beyond the 
pilot project stage. 
Conclusion 3: A fundamental gap exists in terms of empirical work or assessment regarding the 
impact of stakeholder engagement activities. 
Conclusion 4: The incentive regulatory tools that were assessed each have pros and cons.  
Furthermore, there is dependence between the level of sophistication of the regulatory tool and 
the resources and skills required to design and implement it.  
Conclusion 5: NRAs have already started to use different combinations of these tools. However, it 
is too early to identify which approach will work best for stakeholder engagement activities. 
Conclusion 6: Incentive regulation can be enlarged to include other regulators and to consider 
incentives for other stakeholders. 
Recommendations for future work: 
Recommendation 1: Econometric analysis should be conducted to support the quantification of 
costs and benefits of stakeholder engagement activities. Furthermore, this information should be 
made publicly available by the project promoters to enable analyses by either NRAs or third parties. 
Recommendation 2: Share and implement best practices among NRAs on innovative ways to 
incentivise TSOs to engage in state of the art stakeholder engagement approaches. 
Recommendation 3: NRAs should experiment with enlarging incentive regulation by considering a 
role for other regulators and by developing ways to incentivise other stakeholders.  
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 Introduction	
The need for substantial investment in the European electricity transmission grid is well known. The 
investment is necessary to meet the ambitions of market integration and decarbonisation as reflected 
in the EU third package on energy liberalisation. The goals are reiterated in the recently proposed 
package on clean energy for all Europeans.  
In the context of public engagement, electricity infrastructure projects have a significant impact on 
the public at large, which has become increasingly active in expressing concerns and opposition. In 
recent times, due to easier access to information, technology and education, stakeholders have 
become more aware, organised and demanding. Therefore, stakeholder engagement activities are 
becoming increasingly more challenging and important for project promoters to raise public 
awareness and trust in infrastructure development. It is important to note that about 1/3rd of the 93 
Connecting Europe Facilities (CEF) actions for energy infrastructure, up to November 2017, have at 
least some elements of public acceptance2 issues (see Annex III). Moreover, these problems are not 
limited to TSOs3 but are also faced by private entities such as project promoters. 
Suboptimal stakeholder engagement by project developers leads to a short-term distortion of 
infrastructure planning and development; namely, delays of the actual project implementation. 
Although there is limited (publicly available) quantitative data on this, we may cautiously presume 
that there are financial costs attached to these delays (at a minimum the discounting effect on the 
benefits of the project).  
In addition to the short-term distortion, suboptimal stakeholder engagement practices in the context 
of the network planning process may also lead to long-term distortions. For example, in a bid to secure 
public support, a project promoter might exclude those options in network planning that have a 
greater risk of public opposition. Thus, the issue of enhancing stakeholder engagement is urgent. 
Considering the consequential emergence of these short-term and long-term distortions, it is vital to 
ensure that project promoters are encouraged to implement innovative and effective stakeholder 
engagement strategies and reflect the outcomes of those activities in the design of the projects. From 
a regulatory perspective, the use of ‘incentive regulation’ is standard practice for the effective and 
efficient implementation of different TSO functions, including stakeholder engagement. This research 
reviews and assesses the possibility of enlarging incentive regulation to improve public awareness and 
trust in infrastructure development and consequently provides recommendations on the same.  
In the first part of this report, a review of the current state of affairs with regard to stakeholder 
engagement for raising public awareness and trust in transmission infrastructure development is 
conducted. Three key obstacles to effective stakeholder engagement are identified and assessed. 
Furthermore, the study takes stock of on-going stakeholder activities by project developers. A 
framework that classifies these activities into three categories is used. These categories are corporate 
level stakeholder engagement, project-level stakeholder engagement and compensations.  Finally, a 
conceptual insight into avenues for quantifying the impact of stakeholder engagement activities on 
infrastructure project development is provided.  
In the second part of the report, incentive regulation to raise public awareness and trust in the context 
of infrastructure development is re-examine. Three regulatory tools are assessed: price or revenue 
                                                             
2 Cohen et al. (2014) define social acceptance as ‘as a set of outcomes and aspects that leave locals at least as 
well off as they were before the project.’ (p5) 
3 Note that the insights provided in this report may also be applicable to project developers other than TSOs.   
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cap regulation, cost-plus regulation and output-based regulation. Furthermore, avenues for including 
costs of raising public awareness and trust in these regulatory instruments are explored. Finally, 
expansion of incentive regulation frameworks to encompass other relevant stakeholders such as other 
government agencies and authorities, the public at large and independent experts is analysed. The 
possibility of enlarging incentive regulation frameworks by designing and implementing innovative 
incentive mechanisms for stakeholders by the TSOs is also explored.  
The analytical approach is twofold, representing the stages of the research. The first stage consisted 
of conducting desktop research to identify, analyse and categorise innovative practices in stakeholder 
engagement that are currently being applied by transmission system operators in Europe. One of the 
key resources (amongst others) used during this part of the research was the Renewable Grid 
Initiative’s good practices database (RGI Database).  
The second stage consisted of a series of interactions with stakeholders and experts. These (formal 
and informal) interactions were used to shape, to debate and to verify the insights of the desktop 
research and provided a crucial avenue for further understanding the topic as well as feedback on the 
approach applied in this research.  
The first interaction was in the form of a survey of the TSOs conducted in collaboration with the 
ENTSO-E System Development Committee. The survey aimed to gain insights and identify examples 
of the obstacles faced by TSOs while engaging stakeholders. The survey received responses from 11 
TSOs out of about 40 TSO members of ENTSO-E.  
The second interaction was an internal workshop for ENTSO-E members held on 18 October 2017 in 
Brussels. The workshop was attended by representatives from RGI, FSR and ENTSO-E members from 
Belgium, France, Germany Slovenia and Spain (See Annex II). The third interaction was an external 
workshop held on 14 November 2017 in Brussels. The workshop was attended by representatives 
from transmission system operators (TSOs), non-governmental organisation (NGOs), ACER, national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) and academia (see Annex II for more details).  
Additionally, NRAs and other stakeholders were invited to comment on the preliminary findings, and 
the research was also presented at the RGI’s ‘Grids meet Renewables’ conference held in Brussels, 
Feb 20, 2018. The preliminary research ideas were also presented in an early stage at the BNETZA 
science dialogue (October 2017).  
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2, takes stock of the ongoing efforts of 
project developers to raise public awareness and trust and looks at obstacles to engaging in those 
activities. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on revisiting and enlarging incentive regulation, respectively. 
The concluding chapter summarises the key findings of this research and puts forward 
recommendations for further research.   
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 Taking	stock	of	the	current	state	of	affairs		
This chapter takes stock of the current state of affairs with regard to raising public awareness and 
trust. This section is based on insights gained from expert workshops, interviews, case-studies from 
the RGI Database and desktop research. In Section 2.1, three key obstacles to effective stakeholder 
engagement are identified and assessed. In Section 2.2, activities that are currently being conducted 
by the TSOs to raise public awareness and trust are reviewed. In Section 2.3 a conceptual 
understanding of possible approaches towards quantifying the impact of stakeholder engagement on 
infrastructure project development is provided. 2.1 Obstacles	 to	 engaging	 in	 activities	 to	 raise	 public	awareness	and	trust		
According to the ACER monitoring report (ACER, 2017) on the progress of projects of common interest 
about half of the electricity PCIs are behind their initial scheduling due to voluntary rescheduling, e.g. 
in response to changing market conditions or delays. The project developers of delayed electricity 
projects frequently 4  cite permitting issues as one of the reasons for the delay. As stakeholder 
engagement is an important aspect of the permitting process, this can be considered as one of the 
key determining factors for the delays in transmission infrastructure projects. The persisting delays 
due to public support issues suggest that the initiatives do not have the desired impacts. 
Additionally, TSO resources for public awareness and trust activities are fairly small. According to a 
survey of European electricity TSOs, budgets range to a few percentage points of general budgets and 
teams staffed with one to a few dozen persons (see Box 1 and Annex I). The limited resources may be 
one factor, among others, that is limiting the impact of the stakeholder engagement activities. 
In this chapter, three of the main obstacles faced by the TSOs are discussed. The first obstacle is the 
framework offering economic incentives to engage in the activities. The second obstacle is the internal 
TSO procedures, organisation and culture, which may not be adjusted to the complexity of the task at 
hand. The third main obstacle is the legitimacy of the activities. It should also be noted that in the 
functioning of a TSO, these obstacles are not mutually exclusive from one another.  
The first obstacle is not the focus of this report and therefore is not discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Nevertheless, several good practices are presented to offer inspiration to TSOs. For the latter two 
obstacles, the study explores in more depth how enlarging incentive regulation frameworks through 
innovative approaches that go beyond just revisiting the current incentive regulation can lower or 
remove the obstacles. 
Box 1: TSO resources committed to activities to raise public awareness and trust 
The quantity of resources allocated by the TSOs towards stakeholder engagement can provide an 
idea of the level and quality of activities that the TSOs undertake.  
As part of this study, a survey (Annex I) of European electricity TSOs was conducted to provide 
insights and identify examples of key obstacles faced by these organisations in engaging 
stakeholders. In total, about 40 ENTSO-E members across Europe were approached during the 
period of surveying. The survey received responses from 11 ENTSO-E members. The respondents 
were predominantly northwest European TSOs along with a few central and eastern European 
                                                             
4 In 2016, about two thirds of the electricity project promoters who were delayed in that year cited permitting 
as one of the reasons for the delay, while in 2015 about half of the electricity project promoters who were 
delayed in that year cited permitting. 
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TSOs. The survey collected information on the resources committed to stakeholder engagement 
activities both regarding budgets and staffing.  
The survey revealed that resources invested in stakeholder activities are limited, with significant 
differences between TSOs. The staffing for these activities differed from 3-4 up to 40 employees. 
The respondents indicated that budgets for this represent around 1%-2% of the general expense 
budget (or described as ‘a few million euro’ by some respondent was allocated for stakeholder 
engagement activities. The breakdowns of the two key results from the survey are illustrated in 
Figure 1(a-b), respectively. 
  
Figure 1(a-b): Key results from the FSR-ENTSOE Survey 
There are two caveats to bear in mind when considering these survey results: 1) Survey respondents 
often indicated that the numbers are best guesses as resources are dispersed in the TSO 
organisations; 2) budgets for compensation activities are treated separately. 
Another observation comes from the 2017 CMO/Deloitte survey on marketing budgets for different 
industries in the United States. The survey found that the US energy sector (note that the reported 
numbers in that survey include utilities and also oil and gas) spends on average 4% of its overall 
budget on marketing, which is a form of stakeholder engagement; much less than e.g. the 13% 
spent by mining companies, which is also a B2B industry (See Figure 2). 
27%
46%
27%
a. Staff for stakeholder engagement
>10 20>= 45 N/A
55%
45%
b. Stakeholder engagment budget
0-2% (few million) of project budget N/A
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Figure 2: Marketing budget by industries in the United States (Source: Moorman (2017)) 
Notwithstanding the differences between Europe and the US and the specificities that come with 
being a regulated monopoly, both surveys indicate that the resources invested in public awareness 
and trust building by the energy industry are relatively low. However, it should be noted that there 
could be regional differences in the relative importance of the obstacles. The TSO landscape is 
diverse with large and small TSOs having to take on similarly large projects like PCIs. 
 2.1.1 Economic	Incentives	
Any activity undertaken by a firm entails costs. Furthermore, the resources allocated to any activity 
would eventually depend upon the total resources that are at the disposal of the firm (e.g. the total 
budget for a project). Furthermore, the level of engagement of a firm in an activity is dependent upon 
the benefit that it would expect to derive from this activity.  
The same holds true for the stakeholder engagement activities that a TSO carries out. The level of 
those activities is likely to depend on the incentive that the TSO receives to conduct those activities. 
These incentives would range from tangible financial benefits arising from the timely commissioning 
of projects to more intangible gains such as a better public image for the firm.  
The costs of stakeholder activities and the benefits they bring are largely unknown. They might not be 
monitored by TSOs, or the data is at least not publicly available. It would be useful for TSOs to start 
measuring or estimating with the use of suitable proxies the costs and benefits to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). This could shed light on the performance of stakeholder activities and may 
indicate whether those activities add value or increase costs for the energy consumers.  
Without such information, both the TSO and NRA operate blindly and may adopt a prudent, 
conservative attitude towards possible costly innovations with uncertain returns. Today, TSOs 
experiment with innovative approaches. However, within the current economic framework, moving 
from pilots to practice can be complicated. For example, a TSO may treat the additional cost of these 
activities that do not constitute acquiring or building an asset as an operating expense (OPEX)5.  
                                                             
5 Berman and Knight (2013) define operating expenses as ‘the costs required to keep the business going from 
day to day.’ 
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However, this additional opex may not be accepted by the regulator and thus may leave the TSO with 
an additional cost. Such a situation may create a disincentive for innovation. We discuss economic 
incentives in greater detail in Chapter 3 2.1.2 TSO	procedures,	organisation	and	culture	
Traditionally, the TSOs’ tasks were focused on achieving technical excellence in terms of their 
operations. The interaction was limited to the transmission system operator and organisations such 
as the NRAs. Therefore, TSOs have not been very consumer-centric nor have they had any incentive 
to change their procedures, organisation or culture. However, now firms have to deal with the 
stakeholders to ensure public acceptance of their projects. These new activities require an equally 
diverse set of competencies and skills. 
Furthermore, due to better access to information and education, the level of public awareness is ever-
rising. Consumers and other stakeholders want to be involved in the decision-making process. In some 
cases, change in the political regime has also forced the TSO to perform activities out of their comfort 
zone that require innovation. Even the approaches used for certain activities such as spatial planning 
and environmental planning that have been used traditionally require innovation. Such innovation 
may also require a separate or greater set of skills. These tasks can then be either outsourced to 
external experts or developed within the organisation.   
The use of outdated practices in the field can be considered as the first major obstacle that impedes 
the effective implementation of stakeholder engagement activities. This situation could arise when 
the TSO lacks the right background and skills to engage effectively with the public. Thus, to keep up 
with this change, it is necessary for the TSO to review and update the company’s procedures, 
organisation and culture as required. Some TSOs are already engaged in a transformational change of 
their processes, organisation and culture. Some of these examples are elaborated in Box 2.  
 
Box 2: Examples of evolving TSO procedures, organisation and culture. 
In 2016, the Belgian TSO Elia unveiled its Infrastructure 3.0 plan. This plan aimed to ‘help Elia 
become a benchmark for the management of infrastructure projects and implement a society-based 
approach to secure the general public’s acceptance – or even support – of our investments.’(ELIA, 
2016). This consisted of a restructuring of ELIA’s organisational structure. With regard to 
stakeholder engagement, a separate Public Acceptance Division has been in existence within ELIA’s 
management structure since 2016, headed by the ‘Chief Public Acceptance Officer’.   
According to the RGI database, the French and Dutch TSOs, RTE and Tennet, have also changed their 
internal organisation. At RTE (in 2012) the reorganisation of its national departments led to the 
creation of a new department called ‘Département Concertation et Environnement’. Tennet (in 
2013) restructured its department for onshore projects, and two ‘citizen officers’ were appointed 
to expand resources for stakeholder dialogue.   
As part of their corporate social responsibility strategy, the Irish TSO EirGrid works with the National 
Adult Literacy Agency (NALA) to make their documents easier for non-experts to understand. 
EirGrid follows ‘plain English’ guidelines while developing written contents. According to EirGrid's’ 
2016 Annual Report, in 2016, two key public documents created by EirGrid were ‘plain English 
certified’ (EirGrid, 2016). An example of this approach of EirGrid is the information leaflet ‘Have 
Your Say’ that was launched in November 2016. This leaflet explains in ‘plain English’ how EirGrid 
carries out the development of the transmission grid and how the public and other stakeholders 
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can influence this process. The document won the Plain English Award (overall) in 2017 (NALA, 
2017). 
The case of the Italian TSO Terna provides several examples of steps taken to change the TSO’s 
procedures, organisation and culture. Since 2001, when it received certification for UNI EN ISO 
9001: 2000, the TSO has obtained several certifications for complying its management systems with 
the requirements of the International Organization Standardization (ISO) standards (Terna, 2017).  
The main certifications achieved by Terna are for Quality (ISO9001:2015), Environment 
(ISO14001:2004), Occupational Safety (BS OHSAS18001:2007), Anti-Bribery (ISO37001), Energy 
(ISO50001:2011), Information Security Management System (ISO/IEC 27001:2005), Multisite 
Working Laboratory Accreditation (ISO/IEC 17025:2005) and the Accreditation of Multisite 
Calibration Centre (Terna, 2018).   
Another example of cultural change is that Terna has also been ranked in several sustainability 
indices, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this report. Terna also adjusted its hiring 
practices, employing professionals with environmental backgrounds in different departments that 
are related to grid expansion. 
 2.1.3 Legitimacy	
A third obstacle that may affect the efforts and outcomes of the activities to raise public awareness 
and trust is the legitimacy of project promoters and the activities they engage in.  
Adger et al. (2005) define legitimacy as ‘the extent to which decisions are acceptable to participants 
and non-participants that are affected by those decisions.’ It involves having credibility or authority in 
the domain of the task; in other words, TSOs need the mandate to engage in their activities, and this 
mandate can be a legal mandate or a kind of moral right that is accepted by the public. 
TSOs have a clear legal mandate for carrying out the monopoly activities such as operating the grid 
and ensuring the security of supply. In many cases, the TSOs also have a social responsibility, which 
can be part of a legal or moral mandate, to work towards the betterment of the society at large. For 
instance, a TSO may be tasked with supporting the energy transition to a decarbonised energy system 
in its role as infrastructure operator, but also beyond that role. TSOs, like any other organisation, may 
also call for a moral mandate to engage in activities that are just and fair for society.  
However, the recent experiences of TSOs with public opposition against new infrastructure 
developments and the resulting delays, discussed during the two workshops (see Annex II and III), 
suggest that the public does not fully accept the mandate of the TSO. The lack of legitimacy may partly 
be attributed to TSOs being unknown by the public. Indeed, since the unbundling of the energy sector, 
TSOs have a role with few direct interactions with the public and many citizens may not even know 
the name and the function of their national TSO(s). 
To gain legitimacy, the TSO should explain to the stakeholders its role in the supply of energy, 
connecting electricity producing units with energy consumption centres.  In the second order, TSOs 
should explain their role in the energy transition and how the activities of the TSO contribute to that 
change. In particular, project developers should inform the people about why infrastructure projects 
are important contributing elements of the energy transition. Stakeholders who are fully aware of the 
importance of taking action (such as investing in a new transmission line) may have a more positive 
attitude towards the TSO, the activity and the related costs such as paying for a community project to 
compensate strongly affected communities.  
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In reaching out to the public to gain legitimacy, there is a link with the previous obstacle of the TSOs’ 
internal organisation and culture. Firstly, the transmission function in the energy sector depends 
largely on business-to-business relationships, whereas in matters of legitimacy, the TSO has to interact 
with individuals from outside the energy sector. For these individuals understanding the nuances and 
intricacies regarding the need for transmission infrastructure may not be very clear or easy to 
understand. Secondly, TSOs acknowledge that they have traditionally been largely reactive in matters 
of stakeholder engagement, although many TSOs make efforts to become more proactive as 
illustrated in Chapter 2.  2.2 TSO	activities	to	raise	public	awareness	and	trust	
Project developers cite public acceptance among the external factors for delays, yet project 
developers can do and often are making substantial efforts to face these challenges and raise public 
awareness and trust in their infrastructure development. They, for instance, inform the public about 
projects, they consult the public, or they even form partnerships with the public. Considering such 
activities, it can be argued that TSOs and other project developers have some level of control over 
public acceptance issues.  
Stakeholder activities have been catalogued from an industry perspective by the Renewable Grid 
Initiative (RGI), a collaboration platform for and by TSOs and NGOs (see, e.g. Schneider and Sander, 
2012); also from a social sciences (stakeholder theory) or economic sciences perspective by, for 
instance, the ‘stakeholder ladder’ by Friedman and Miles (2006), or the distinction between direct 
project costs and cost of externalities by Tobiasson and Jamasb (2014), respectively. These academic 
and practitioners’ perspectives are integrated into the classification in this study, which is orientated 
to the economic regulation of the stakeholders involved in infrastructure development. 
In this report, which focuses on economic regulation, a categorisation is proposed based on the nature 
of the activities and related costs. TSOs, like any other business organisation, can gain support for their 
core business by engaging in three types of activities.  
• Activities that create goodwill6 in general: corporate level stakeholder engagement 
• Activities that create goodwill for specific projects: project-level stakeholder engagement 
• Damages for negative externalities (of specific projects): compensation 
It should be noted that in practice, TSOs utilise a combination of one or more of the activities 
mentioned above.  
The following section discusses these types of activity, making a distinction between corporate level 
stakeholder engagement activities and project-level stakeholder engagement activities, on the one 
hand, and stakeholder compensation activities, on the other hand. Examples of activities, as collected 
through a survey of European electricity TSOs, the RGI best practice database and other public sources 
are showcased. Finally, the controversy over the type of activities from a regulatory perspective is 
discussed.   
                                                             
6 Commons (1936) provides the following explanation of goodwill: ‘goodwill is the high point of fair competition 
and reasonable value in the public interest, contrasted with the economics of free competition and maximum net 
income for private interests, regardless of others and regardless of public interest. Goodwill is, further, the 
meeting point of pure institutional economics and pure net-income economics. It has two sides. On the net-
income side it augments the private net income beyond that of competitors. On the institutional side it is the 
reasonable ethical relation towards other buyers and sellers, who are also members of the same national 
economy.’ (p239) 
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2.2.1 Corporate	level	and	project-level	stakeholder	engagement	activities	
Stakeholder engagement activities aim to bring the stakeholder perspective into an organisation’s 
internal business processes. They can concern the improvement of the goodwill of stakeholders 
towards the whole of the business organisation – this is the corporate level stakeholder engagement. 
The activities can also concern the improvement of goodwill towards specific endeavours of the 
organisation such as infrastructure development in the case of TSOs – this is the project-level. Before 
discussing the differences between these two types of stakeholder engagement activities, the 
commonalities between all stakeholder engagement activities are discussed.  
2.2.1.1 Corporate	level	stakeholder	engagement		
Corporate level stakeholder engagement activities are defined here as the interactions with 
stakeholders that are not related to a specific project investment but are conducted with the public 
at large. The goal of such engagement is to create goodwill regarding the TSOs as a corporate entity 
and for all of its business activities. Through building name recognition, a strong reputation and 
positive image with the public, the TSO expects to reap the rewards, indirectly, by experiencing larger 
levels of public support in general and during the execution of specific projects.  
The most common examples of corporate level stakeholder engagement are corporate social 
activities, educational campaigns (on energy supply chain), advertisement, and sponsoring. The costs 
entailed for these kinds of stakeholder engagement can be classified as corporate level costs. 
Corporate level stakeholder engagement practice 1: social media presence 
In recent years, with the advent of social media, firms can directly and easily reach the public at large 
via the internet and the public can provide direct feedback on these activities. Several TSOs across 
Europe are utilising new media channels and social media websites to promote and create awareness 
regarding their day-to-day activities. Examples of TSOs on the micro-blogging site Twitter are RTE, 
Tennet, 50Hertz amongst others. Figure 3 illustrates the Twitter presence of the four TSOs. Similarly, 
TSOs also have a presence on the social media website Facebook. These platforms are monitored and 
updated by the TSOs at very regular time intervals (if not continuously).  
 
    
Figure 3: A snapshot of the Twitter handles for four TSOs  
Corporate level stakeholder engagement practice 2: education activities  
Another example of the corporate level stakeholder interaction initiative is the education programme 
of 50Hertz in Germany. According to the RGI database, educational events are organised annually at 
primary schools by 50Hertz in collaboration with the Independent Institute for Environmental Issues. 
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The goal is to engage school students in learning about the energy transition using information and 
learning exhibitions. At such events, the students may interact with politicians, industry and other 
authorities on this topic. This education programme can be seen as a neutral form of stakeholder 
participation. 
Corporate level stakeholder engagement practice 3: socially responsible businesses  
Commissioning and utilising NGO reports to monitor the TSOs’ social responsibility can be considered 
as an example of corporate level stakeholder engagement. ELIA, the Belgian TSO, commissioned a 
report from Aves Natagora / Belgian BirdLife, an NGO working for bird and nature protection, in 
collaboration with Natuurpunt, INBO and Vogelbescherming Vlaanderen on ‘Reducing bird mortality 
caused by high and very high voltage power lines in Belgium’ (Derouaux et al., 2012).  
Swissgrid hosted a general meeting with representatives of important Swiss NGOs (Greenpeace, WWF 
Pro Natura and Swiss Energy Foundation) to discuss grid development. The stated goal of this exercise 
was that of fostering transparent and open communication. The meeting discussed possibilities for 
future cooperation and future challenges for Swissgrid as the owner of the transmission network. The 
RGI database reports that this event was held in 2012.  
The Spanish TSO RED Electrica (REE), in collaboration with the Mediterranean Institute for Advanced 
Studies (MIAS), the University of the Balearic Islands and the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), 
has developed an innovative method for the recovery of Posidonia Oceanica seagrass meadows – 
which are vital for the survival of the Mediterranean ecosystem (REE, 2016). It is estimated that 1-5% 
of annual seagrass global degradation can be attributed to wind farms and submarine cables (RGI 
database).  This restoration project was implemented at the Balearic Islands, and was completed in 
2016. A detailed methodological guide will be published by REE to make it possible to replicate this 
method at other locations. It should be noted that the R&D was initially part of the compensation for 
the interconnector between Mallorca and Ibiza. However, in time the project expanded into a 
corporate level activity. The next stage of this project is called the ‘subsea forest’ and involves the 
large-scale recovery of Posidonia meadows. 
To reduce bird mortality (especially of the Saker Falcon populations, an endangered species), the 
Hungarian TSO MAVIR have installed artificial nests on power pylons. As of 2015, 404 nests have been 
installed. The programme also organised several awareness events for children as well as adults along 
with online nest monitoring. The company also began a bird conservation blog in 2014.  According to 
the database, 250 Saker Falcons accounting for 75% of its population in Hungary nest on these pylons. 
Furthermore, the live online monitoring has a viewership of 1.2 million globally. MAVIR also receives 
feedback and requests for presentations on its activities three to five times a month.  
As part of the LIFE Birds on Electrogrid initiative, the Lithuanian TSO LitGrid is collaborating with the 
Lithuanian ornithological society to reduce the impact of overhead transmission lines on bird life. The 
expected results are the following. Installation of 8,600 bird diverters in selected areas covering 108 
KMs of transmission line (2014-2018). Installation of 6,000 fishbone devices and 6,000 increased 
diameter insulators to protect white storks from being caught in a short circuit. Installation of 500 
nesting boxes on 110kV polls for the common kestrel bird. For more details see European Commission 
(2016) 
A higher level of controversy over corporate level stakeholder engagement costs 
According to the discussion during the workshops (see Annexes II and III), corporate level stakeholder 
engagement costs raise significantly more controversy than project-level stakeholder costs. The root 
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of the controversy lies in the debate over whether a natural monopoly such as a TSO with a regulated 
income stream should be spending money on activities to build name recognition and corporate 
reputation, which are generally part of the corporate level stakeholder engagement strategy – 
especially since the benefits of these activities not always immediately quantifiable. 
In the expert workshops arguments for both perspectives were offered. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that such activities do not add any value in terms of increase in benefit. On the other hand, a 
positive image may be useful for improving public support during the execution of new transmission 
expansion projects. Furthermore, the regulatory frameworks governing such activities are sometimes 
unclear. The following hypothetical example was provided during our interaction with an expert. It 
may be that a TSO is not allowed to spend money on sponsoring a community by paying for the naming 
rights of the football stadium, but it may be allowed to pay for the construction of a new stadium for 
the community as part of a compensation package. Considering the ambiguity in regulatory practice, 
corporate level stakeholder engagement costs are subject to a significant level of controversy.   
2.2.1.2 Project-level	stakeholder	engagement		
Project-level stakeholder engagement is defined here as the interactions with stakeholders involved 
in specific investment projects with the goal of creating goodwill for the project in the short term. In 
many countries, including the stakeholder perspective in infrastructure development decision-making 
(such as permitting) is considered so important that project-level activities are made mandatory for 
the project developer. Examples of such stakeholders are project affected parties such as the 
neighbours of the project corridor or the mayors of towns in the project corridor, but also stakeholders 
who have an indirect interest at stake such as environmental groups. Furthermore, the costs entailed 
in executing such activities can be defined as project-level costs of stakeholder engagement.  
Examples of project-level stakeholder engagement activities include local dialogue forums, 
stakeholder workshops, information campaigns (at an early stage of project development), 
information stands and fairs, project branding, educational campaigns, public consultation of network 
planning, and project advisory boards. The best practice examples, as collected by the RGI, show that 
effective project-level stakeholder engagement requires a combination of these activities.  
Project-level stakeholder engagement practice 1: SuedOstLink, 50 Hertz 
The SuedOstLink being built by 50Hertz is an illustration of good project-level stakeholder 
engagement. The German TSO 50Hertz plans to build a 580 KM HVDC connection from Saxony-Anhalt 
in the north to Bavaria in the south. The 50Hertz website (2018) explicitly states ‘SuedOstLink: 
continuous dialogue improves the planning results’. The TSO applied three key activity formats to 
engage with the stakeholders to enable public participation during the planning and approval process. 
To provide stakeholders with insight into the planning process as well as to receive direct feedback 
from experts on this particular project, 50Hertz has held three ‘planning forums’ since the summer of 
2016. The stakeholders consisted of politicians, regional and local administration representatives as 
well as experts on relevant topics such as the environment and economics. This is an example of 
neutral/proactive stakeholder involvement.  
The second format for interaction involved inviting the public at large (and town representatives) to 
attend ‘Information markets’ that were set up in the town halls of relatively large municipalities in the 
region. The goal of this exercise was to provide an update on the development of the project and at 
the same time receive feedback for better planning of identified route corridors. 50Hertz has 
organised ten of these ‘information markets’ since the autumn of 2017.  
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The third format called the ‘info-tour’ was targeted at the same group as the ‘information market’ and 
consisted of using an open-air lorry called the ‘DialogMobil’ to disseminate information during market 
days or in pedestrian areas. To date, 50Hertz have organised such a program once. done this once.  
Project-level stakeholder engagement practice 2:  
The Italian TSO Terna assessed the impact of a new overhead line between Calabria and Sicily on the 
migratory bird populations in the region. Two radars were utilised to collect data on the migratory 
patterns, numbers and flying height of the birds. Observation points operated by ornithologists were 
set up on both sides of the strait of Messina. The data was collected over a period of three years and 
included more than 115,000 migratory bird passages, tracking 70,000 birds in the spring and 45,000 
in the autumn. The results of the study concluded that the overhead line did not have any impact on 
the bird traffic. Furthermore, the study provided valuable insights on general bird migration in the 
region as well as the specific impact of overhead lines on bird migration. Terna developed this research 
practice in collaboration with the NGOs: Ornis Italica and MEDRAPTORS, and the eco-ethology 
laboratory at the University of Pavia. More details on Terna’s initiatives for reducing the impact of 
power lines on bird life are available in (Terna, 2017). 
In partnership with the Lithuanian Fund of Nature, LitGrid carried out environmental surveillance at 
the construction site for the LitPol link. This was done in addition to the Environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) carried out in 2010. Between April – August 2014, monitoring was undertaken for 
identifying protected species and habitats. A rare early-marsh orchid was identified and relocated. 
The results from the monitoring process were made available to all stakeholders.    
Low level of controversy of project-level stakeholder engagement costs  
Project-level stakeholder engagement activities are widely adopted by transmission system operators, 
and their costs are not controversial in regulatory terms as they are seen as project development 
costs, consent costs or alike. Some project-level stakeholder activities are even mandatory by law, for 
instance, the organisation of one or more public consultations as part of the permitting process. Note 
that NRAs decide mandatory activities at national level.  2.2.2 Compensation	activities		
The mere engagement of stakeholders to generate public support may not be sufficient in the case 
that some stakeholders suffer negative externalities of a project. In welfare economics, compensation 
is a way to mitigate those negative effects (Hicks, 1939). The beneficiaries of a project could share 
back some of the project’s benefits as damages to those affected to make them better off. The 
outcome of the project and compensation would thus leave everyone better off than a situation 
without the project.  
Compensation can be of a financial nature, involving payments to affected stakeholders, or it could 
involve compensation in kind by adjusting the project to create fewer externalities (typically at the 
expense of a higher project construction cost). The most common examples are direct monetary 
compensation to project affected persons such as landowners and farmers, community monetary 
compensation such as building of community centres, hospitals and sports facilities, or building sound 
screens on highways in the vicinity of the overhead transmission line. Non-monetary compensation 
may consist of changing the project design by undergrounding or modifying the route, use of compact 
pylon designs, etc. 
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Many countries have compensation schemes for objectively negatively affected stakeholders such as 
landowners who suffer a reduction in the value of their land; these countries include e.g. Belgium, UK, 
France, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.  
Several countries have schemes to compensate by means of funding community projects; these 
countries include, e.g. France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia and Spain. Non-monetary 
compensations have been provided by TSOs in, e.g., Belgium, Germany, France, Italy 
Compensation, three practices: Ireland, Italy and France 
Eirgrid, the TSO from the Republic of Ireland provides community-level compensations in specific 
geographic locations surrounding a new infrastructure, called ‘proximity pay’. The compensation is 
provided in the form of grants from a ‘Community Fund’ set up by EirGrid. This concept of Community 
Fund is part of EirGrid's company policy and will be utilised for any new transmission infrastructure 
project.  
An example of such compensation is the 110kV Mullingar-Kinnegad line. A total fund of €360,000 was 
made available to organisations of communities situated 2 kilometres on either side of the line. 
According to the RGI database, in 2016, 37 community groups received funding from the ‘Mullingar-
Kinnegad Fund’ for various activities such as music, athletics, sports, childcare services and senior 
citizen support. More Information about this project is available in (RGI, 2016). 
In Italy, the TSO signs an initial ‘Protocol of Understanding’ with relevant eligible authorities. The total 
amount of money for compensation is set as a percentage of total cost and its allocation to the 
authorities is based on a method developed by an expert consultant. Terna then creates a list of 
project categories that it would fund. Based on this list, the local authorities propose activities within 
these categories. Next, a contract is signed between Terna and the municipality. Commonly funded 
community projects are playgrounds, streetlights, pedestrian/cycling paths and restoration work of 
schools and heritage (RGI, 2016). 
The French TSO, RTE, builds public support through appropriate monetary compensation in the form 
of funding community projects as well as through non-monetary compensation. In accordance with 
an agreement established with the French State, RTE must dedicate 8% to 10% of the (re)construction 
costs to the funding of projects that bring sustainable improvements to an area such as a hospital. The 
projects are proposed by various categories of stakeholders and are part of the ‘Project Support 
Programme’. To improve the selection of projects, RTE included a crowdfunding element as a way for 
stakeholders to directly express their preference for certain community projects.  
The innovative non-monetary compensation approach used by RTE to foster public acceptance 
involves adjustments to the project design. RTE decided to implement a new pylon design while 
upgrading a 400kV overhead line for better integration with the surrounding landscape to improve 
public acceptance. Furthermore, RTE decided to involve the public directly in the decision-making 
regarding the new pylon design.  
Initially, a tender was floated for new concepts, which led to the submission of 80 innovative designs. 
Based on local requirements, this list was then reduced to three proposals. These three proposals 
were discussed in forums called ‘expert commissions’ where citizens could provide their input. 
Eventually, the ‘Équilibre Pylon design’ was selected. 16 KM out of the 30 KM long 400kV line would 
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be equipped with the new pylon design.7 More information on this project is available on the RTE 
webpage. 
A higher level of controversy over compensation costs 
Compensation costs can be considered to have a significantly high level of controversy and are the 
most controversial among the three approaches discussed in this topic. The reasons that the provision 
of compensation can be controversial are the following. Firstly, not all TSOs have a mandate to make 
decisions regarding payments of compensation. For some TSOs (such as TERNA), the quantity of 
money that can be spent on compensation is strictly regulated. Furthermore, all consumers eventually 
pay the cost of compensation. Therefore, such compensations entail a significant reallocation of 
welfare from society as a whole, towards a set of selected parties. These beneficiaries may be 
individuals or a community. A degree of subjectivity is involved in perceiving or assessing the 
transparency behind the purpose of such transfer of wealth even when it is done within the necessary 
and required legal boundaries. The views on the legitimacy and purpose of compensation may vary 
from the above-described definition to the other extreme that would perceive it as ‘bribing’ these 
parties to ensure the implementation of the project, even if this is a subjective and mistaken 
perception. Compensation activities also open the possibility of strategic games by vested interests to 
make monetary or political gains, e.g. holding out to get the maximum amount of compensation. 2.3 Quantifying	the	impact	of	stakeholder	engagement	
Despite the abundance of qualitative evidence of TSOs undertaking diverse public engagement 
initiatives, e.g. in the RGI database, there is little quantitative assessment of the impact of these 
activities on the project developers’ business. Currently, the lack of (publicly available) data makes it 
impossible to perform a quantitative analysis  
Empirical work regarding stakeholder engagement activities, on the one hand, and the performance 
of the project developers, e.g. in terms of developing infrastructure, on the other hand, requires a 
robust econometric analysis. The sector could either conduct their own quantitative analysis or make 
the data available to the public for assessment. Such an analysis would substantiate the debate and 
help both TSOs and NRAs in dealing with economic incentives to raise public awareness and trust. 
Furthermore, such an analysis would give greater confidence to regulators for incentivising such 
activities as they would now have a better understanding of the costs and benefits of various 
stakeholder engagement activities. Box 3 provides an illustrative example of the impact of 
quantification. 
Greene (2003) describes econometrics as ‘the field of economics that concerns itself with the 
application of mathematical statistics and the tools of statistical inference to the empirical 
measurement of relationships postulated by economic theory.’ Several modelling techniques with 
increasing levels of complexity have been proposed in the literature for conducting econometric 
analysis (e.g., linear regression models, nonlinear regression models, simultaneous equation models 
etc.) (Greene, 2003).  However, any robust econometric analysis requires the identification of relevant 
independent and dependent variables. 8  The evaluation would further entail the monitoring of 
relevant data for several countries, projects and years to build a data set for analysis. Furthermore, 
                                                             
7 See RGI database and www.rte-ligne-avelingavrelle.com for more details.  
8 In econometric analysis the independent variables are the factors that explain the behaviour of a dependent 
variable (the outcome), i.e. the change of an independent factor explains to small or large extent the change in 
the dependent variable. (See Greene (2003) for more details on econometric analysis). 
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the analysis must be performed to the highest methodological standards to rule out, e.g. selection 
bias9 and the effect of data that are not independent of each other and to be explicit about all choices 
and assumptions that are inherent in such analytical research.   
In the remainder of this section, possible independent and dependent variables that could be used for 
conducting such an econometric analysis are conceptually discussed, along with the limitations of such 
an approach. Table 1 summarises the variables, company-specific dependent variables and societal 
dependent variable that are discussed in more detail.  
Table 1: Summary of variables that can be used for the econometric analysis 
Independent 
variable 
Company-specific dependent 
variable 
Societal dependent variable  
Budget and Staff 
Media reports 
Stock price 
Brand valuation 
Regulatory asset base 
Congestion management 
Delays 
Project cost 
 2.3.1 Independent	 variables	 for	 quantifying	 the	 impact	 of	 stakeholder	engagement		
In this section, two possible independent variables that can be used as inputs for an econometric 
analysis to quantify the impact of stakeholder engagement are identified and discussed, namely:  staff 
and budget, and media reports.  
2.3.1.1 Staff	and	Budget	
For a firm to conduct any activity requires expending resources. The resources may be a combination 
of person-hours that employees dedicate towards the task and the monetary cost incurred over and 
above the employee costs. The same holds true for stakeholder engagement. The project developer 
must allocate resources towards such public acceptance activities and may have a set budget for the 
same. This variable can be measured in a disaggregated manner by logging the number of manhours 
that employees spent on specific stakeholder engagement activities and monetary overheads from 
such beyond the employee time or in an aggregated manner as the total cost to the company of an 
activity ex-post. In case the company has set a budget ex-ante for activity, this can also be considered 
as the value of the variable.  
However, limitations to a collection of this data are evident from the responses to the survey (See 
Annex I) that was conducted as part of this study. Respondents often indicated the numbers are best 
guesses as resources are dispersed in the TSO organisations (usually a mix centralised resources in 
corporate level departments and decentralised resources in regional and/or project-based teams). 
Therefore, accurately measuring the staff and budget allocation for stakeholder engagement requires 
a significant effort that entails an administrative cost.  
2.3.1.2 Media	reports	
Another independent variable used in the literature on econometric analysis that could be relevant is 
the media reporting of stakeholder events. The impact of positive and adverse media reports on the 
dependent variables used for the analysis can then be assessed.  
                                                             
9 Selection bias can for instance occur when activities that were perceived as successful are structurally reported 
more than activities that were perceived to have a negative outcome, as a result the data set would be wrongly 
skewed towards more successful activities. 
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This variable was applied by Henisz et al. (2014) in the context of the gold mining industry.  The 
research aimed to ‘study […] the financial impact of stakeholder engagement through the development 
of media-based stakeholder event data that captures the level of conflict or cooperation between the 
company and its various political, social, and economic stakeholders.’ According to the authors, such 
an approach has several advantages, namely: the availability of a greater sample size. The opinions 
and actions reported by media may give a better representation of the relationship between the 
stakeholders and the company compared to a third-party evaluation. Furthermore, these reports 
would also provide a clear view of how the stakeholders perceive the company.   
However, the collection of such variable data can be a daunting task. Henisz et al. (2014)  analysed 
50,000 stakeholder events that were reported in the media. The analyses focused on data for 26 mines 
owned by 19 publicly listed companies over a period of 15 years (1993-2008). Furthermore, an 
econometric model is a simplification of reality and thus certain discrete choices and assumptions are 
made while conducting the analysis. To ensure consistency in the evaluation of the media reports, 
Henisz et al. (2014) utilise several ‘inter-rater agreement’ (IRA) indices to assess the convergence of 
different data collector’s judgements. The authors define IRA as ‘the level of similarity between 
different coders’ judgments and the extent to which their work can be considered interchangeable’ 
based on the work of LeBreton and Senter (2008). Another example of the complexity was the 
identification of verbs and a quantification of the ‘degree of conflict/cooperation’ they convey.  The 
study identified more than 11,000 verbs and used a variation of the scale developed by Goldstein 
(1992) for the quantification. Therefore, it is critical to provide appropriate training to the persons that 
would be involved in this process.   2.3.2 Dependent	variables	for	quantifying	the	impact	of	stakeholder	engagement	
In this section, six possible dependent variables that can be used for econometric analysis are 
identified. The dependent variables are further classified based on their relevance to a company or 
societal benefit. The company-specific dependent variables are stock prices, brand valuation and 
Regulatory asset base; the dependent variables relevant from the perspective of societal benefit are 
congestion management costs, project delays and project costs.  
2.3.2.1 Company-specific	dependent	variables	
An econometric analysis that is conducted from a firm’s perspective requires dependent variables that 
would aid in measuring the impact on the performance of the firm.  Such quantification would provide 
insight to the investors and the management for deciding on allocating resources for stakeholder 
engagement activities.  2.3.2.1.1 Company	stock	prices	
The development of transmission infrastructure projects requires access to finance from external 
investors. These investors use several criteria including the stock market value of the company under 
consideration while making their investment decisions. An adverse impact on these criteria would 
thus have an impact on the ability to access finance. Thus, an inter-relationship between stakeholder 
engagement and company stock prices could prove to be an important indicator for project 
developers. However, this variable would be applicable only to TSOs that are listed on the stock 
market. 
An approach towards to quantifying the financial impact of stakeholder engagement that has been 
utilised in the literature is based on the ‘instrumental stakeholder theory’ (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995). On instrumental stakeholder theory, Jones (1995) argues that 
‘Certain types of corporate social performance are manifestations of attempts to establish trusting, 
cooperative firm/stakeholder relationships and should be positively linked to a company's financial 
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performance.’ As discussed in Section 2.3.1.2, Henisz et al. (2014) conducted an econometric analysis 
of data from the gold mining industry to empirically prove the instrumental stakeholder theory for the 
gold mining industry in Canada. The results from the study indicated the ‘existence of a direct positive 
and economically substantive relationship between stakeholder support and financial market 
valuation.’ In follow-up research Dorobantu et al. (2017) assessed the impact that the mobilisation of 
a critical mass of political and social stakeholders would have on an organisation’s market value.  
Another variation of the variable that can be utilised is replacing stock prices by the company’s 
sustainability index ranking as the proxy for gauging the impact of stakeholder engagement. This 
variation can be used by stock-market listed as well as unlisted companies; however, it is necessary to 
be listed on a sustainability index. Terna has already been listed on sustainability indices (Terna, 2016). 
The Dow Jones corporate sustainability assessment methodology is described in (RobecoSAM, 2016) 2.3.2.1.2 Brand	valuation	
Another dependent variable that can be used as a proxy for gauging the impact of stakeholder 
engagement activities is the brand value. A positive impact on brand valuation would be indicative of 
a positive company perception by the public and vice versa for negative impact on brand valuation. 
Brand valuation too can impact the access to finance from external investors as this may form part of 
the assessment criteria. The advantage of this variable is that it can be used by stock market listed as 
well as unlisted firms. Jones (2005) develops a model of stakeholder equities that can be used as a 
tool for assessing the value of a relationship between a brand and multiple stakeholders.  2.3.2.1.3 Regulatory	asset	base	
The regulated asset base of the TSO can be another dependent variable that can be utilised as a proxy 
for the firm’s performance. The regulatory asset base is a key determining factor for a TSO’s annual 
revenue and consequently the performance of the firm. An essential element in calculating the value 
of RAB is the new investment in new projects that are to be included.  Therefore, RAB can be 
considered as a dependent variable to assess the impact of stakeholder engagement on the company’s 
performance  
2.3.2.2 Societal	benefit	
An econometric analysis can also be conducted from a regulator’s perspective. In such a case, 
dependent variables that provide insight on societal benefit are required for the assessment. Such an 
analysis can be used by the regulator when evaluating the need for and the level of incentive required 
to enable stakeholder engagement activities.  2.3.2.2.1 Congestion	management	costs	
A key dependent variable from the societal benefit perspective for assessing the impact of stakeholder 
engagement is the congestion management cost. When the capacity of the grid to carry electricity is 
constrained, the TSO is required to carry out congestion management by taking steps such as re-
dispatching. However, re-dispatch actions are costly in terms of more expensive electricity generation 
units being activated with potentially higher carbon emissions. Reinforcement of the grid 
infrastructure may remove the structural congestions and thus the need for re-dispatching actions. In 
other words, the avoided costs of re-dispatching may be a benefit of timely implementation of 
infrastructure projects.  
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Figure 4 below depicts the aggregated congestion management costs for Germany as recorded on the 
ENTSO-E transparency platform for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 (ENTSO-E, 2018a) 10,11. It can be 
observed that over the past three years, the average annual cost has been roughly €950 million. This 
is a cost which would be passed on to the consumer. Thus, early completion of transmission expansion 
projects would lead to savings from avoided re-dispatch costs and improve overall societal benefit. 
These financial savings could then be used by the TSO to expand their public acceptance activity 
programmes. It can be noted here that the German network expansion plan (NEP), envisages an 
investment of €32–34 billion by 2030. 
 
 
Figure 4: Cost of Congestion Management for German TSOs (Source: ENTSO-E Transparency platform) 
At the EU level, an estimation of the cost of ‘no grid’ due to lack of new investment is presented in the 
summary report by ENTSO-E on Europe Power System 2040 (ENTSO-E, 2018b). The report states that 
‘[a] lack of new investments by 2040 would hinder the development of the integrated energy market 
and would lead to a lack of competitiveness. In turn, this would increase prices on electricity markets 
leading to higher bills for consumers. By 2040, the ‘No Grid’ extra bill (€43 billion a year in the average 
case) would be largely above the expected cost of the new grid (150bln€ in total in the TYNDP 2016 
plus internal reinforcements, 25% discount rate).’ However, it should be noted that the cost reported 
in this document would be dispersed among several actors in the system. 
  
                                                             
10 The platform provides monthly congestion management costs for each TSO over the period of Jan 2015 – Dec 
2017. The congestion costs presented consist of three components, re-dispatching costs, countertrading costs 
and other costs. Re-dispatching actions are observed to account for most of the congestion management costs 
for the TSOs under consideration. The re-dispatching costs for Germany are further made up of costs of 
multilateral remedial actions (MRAs), interruptible loads, feed-in management of renewables and activation of 
reserve power. This is in accordance with the Art. 2 (26) of EU Regulation 543/2013. It should be noted that the 
website also explicitly states that ‘the displayed costs are preliminary values and may be subject to updates’. 
11 The platform also offered the following explanation regarding the reporting of the counter trading costs: 
‘There are certain network constellations, e.g. when tie lines are concerned, where TenneT applies counter 
trading measures with EnDK on joint request of 50Hertz and TenneT. Due to the joint request, the costs for the 
counter trade are borne by TenneT and 50Hertz in equal shares.’ 
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Box 3: Illustration of quantification - Thuringian power bridge project 
This box describes a hypothetical example to illustrate how the knowledge of the costs and benefit 
may impact the attitude of project developers and NRAs towards stakeholder engagement. The 
illustration is based on the Thuringian power bridge project. The reason for using this example is 
that the investment cost, as well as congestion management cost savings due to the project, are 
known. 
The total project cost for the Thuringian power bridge project was €348 million (Commission, 2013). 
According to 50Hertz, the development of this project led to congestion management savings of 
€318 million between 01/2016 and 03/2018 (Verse, 2018). Therefore, in a hypothetical situation, if 
such a project had faced delays due to permitting issues or public engagement issues, it could be 
assumed that there would be the loss of societal benefit from congestion management cost for 
each month of delay. On the other hand, by completing the project early or on time, the additional 
cost incurred from the greater public engagement that may be required to speed up the 
development process can be recovered from savings of congestion management cost. 
If such a quantification was available to the project developer ex-ante, the project developer might 
be encouraged to undertake innovative stakeholder engagement activities to ensure rapid 
completion of the project. On the other hand, the quantification would aid the NRA in deciding 
whether or not to provide any additional incentive.  
Furthermore, congestion management is the only proxy that is considered. There may be other 
currently unquantified benefits (or costs), the quantification of which would further aid in decision 
making for project developers and regulators alike. 	2.3.2.2.2 Project	delays		
A short-term distortion that may be caused by suboptimal stakeholder engagement by project 
developers is delays of the actual project implementation. The latest ACER (2017) report on the 
progress of projects of common interests confirms this distortion. It is observed that more than half 
of the electricity PCIs are behind their initial scheduling because they were rescheduled, e.g. to deal 
with changing market conditions, or, for the majority, because they were delayed by external factors. 
The report also provides a detailed analysis of the external factors that are cited for the delays of the 
analysed year. The analysis indicates that public support is the direct or indirect reason for the delays 
(e.g. 20/33 projects mentioned permits as the main reason for delays over the course of 2016/2017; 
this was also the main reason cited in 2015/2016).  
Although there is no (publicly available) quantitative data on the matter, it may be cautiously 
presumed that there are financial and societal costs attached to these delays (at a minimum the 
discounting effect on the benefits of the project). Thus, the effect of stakeholder engagement 
activities can be evaluated in terms of the impact on the timelines for completion of the project. 
Further monetisation from the impact of delays can be developed based on an econometric analysis 
that considers aspects such as security of supply, congestion management (as discussed earlier) etc. 
Some regulators already provide dedicated incentives for timely completion of transmission 
infrastructure projects (discussed in later chapters). However, as can be inferred from the findings of 
the ACER report, the causes for delays go beyond stakeholder engagement. Therefore, project delays 
can be considered as a relevant dependent variable in an econometric analysis for assessing the 
impact of stakeholder engagement.  
25 
 
2.3.2.2.3 Project	costs	
Any savings that may occur due to a reduction in the project costs can be considered as a societal 
benefit and vice versa. Therefore, the use of project costs as an output for an econometric analysis 
can provide useful insights about the societal impact of stakeholder engagement activities. A 
hypothetical example could be that the implementation of an innovative stakeholder engagement 
strategy may have a strong correlation to a reduction in the total project costs. This variable would be 
more relevant for the regulators as the TSO may not have incentives for reducing the total project 
costs as the project would become part of their RAB and they would be remunerated according to the 
regulatory regime in the member state.  2.3.3 Limitations	of	the	quantification	approach		
The use of an econometric analysis provides quantification of activities under consideration. However, 
it is important to highlight some of the limitations of this approach. One limitation that is already 
discussed in Section 0 and 2.3.2 is the difficulty of monitoring the data.  
A second crucial limitation is that a statistical correlation is not necessarily indicative of causality. In 
other words, a strong statistical correlation between an independent and dependent variable may not 
mean that the change in the dependent variable was solely due to the change in the independent 
variable. This is due to the presence of other variables that may not be accounted for in the analysis 
and yet may have a strong effect on the dependent variable. Such variables are called disturbance 
variables (Greene, 2003). For instance, a stock market valuation of a company may be affected by the 
general economic or political situation. The speed of the renewable transition in Germany has had a 
strong impact on the congestion management costs, thus would implicitly impact the results of the 
quantification.  Haney and Pollitt (2013) highlight the difficulty in selecting variables in the context of 
benchmarking. The authors state that ‘Transmission service provision involves a complicated 
relationship between inputs and outputs. Ideally all inputs, outputs and environmental variables should 
be measured directly or indirectly in assessing transmission system performance. If all variables are 
not considered and if regulators decide to choose or weight certain variables, the measured efficiency 
can change significantly.’  
Thirdly, even if the same methodology is applied for conducting the econometric analysis for all TSOs, 
the results may not be easily comparable. This is because most TSOs operate in differing institutional 
settings. This would reflect several aspects of project development such as project delays and project 
cost. This issue is described by Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) in the context of international benchmarking 
of TSOs. The authors claim that international benchmarking ‘raises particular difficulties. The most 
notable issue is that of comparability and quality of data, which may only be improved in time and 
requires co-operation among the regulators. In addition, when comparing monetary units the correct 
handling of currency exchange rates is of particular importance. Relative differences in input prices 
(e.g. wage rates, taxes, and rates of return on capital) beyond the control of the firm may have to be 
taken into consideration.’ 
Henisz et al. (2014) also conducted their study on mines that were in one country (Canada) thus 
making the results comparable. The authors explicitly state that one of the limitations of their research 
is a generalisation of the results beyond the data set under consideration. The authors state that an 
avenue for future research is to study ‘not only trade-offs but also complementarity between resource 
allocations to enhance stakeholder cooperation and productive efficiency.’ 2.3.4 Hypothetical	example	for	understanding	the	utility	of	quantification	
To better understand the utility of this quantification, two hypothetical examples are presented in this 
section.  
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The first example is of a project developer building a transmission line to alleviate congestion in a 
region. The project cost is estimated to be € 100 million and is expected to be commissioned in ‘n’ 
months. An econometric analysis provides a correlation between stakeholder engagement activities 
and saving in project development time presented in Table 2. It can be assumed that cost of the 
activities increases depending upon the required resources, skills as well the comprehensiveness of 
the activity and innovation. Note that any additional stakeholder engagement activity would impact 
the project cost. The other dependent variables used to assess the societal benefit is congestion 
management cost. The analysis considers four different scenarios of congestion management costs 
that are incurred each month without the construction of this line (see Table 3). 
Table 2: Correlation between stakeholder engagement 
activities and saving in project development time 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
Approach 
Additional 
costs of the 
activity (€ 
Million) 
Timing 
savings 
(months) 
A (No additional 
activity) 
0 0 
B 1 1 
C 5 3 
D 15 5 
E 25 10 
 
Table 3: Scenarios indicating of congestion management 
costs that are incurred each month 
Scenario Congestion 
Management Cost 
(Mil €/Month) 
I 1 
II 2 
III 3 
IV 4 
 
Table 4 provides insight into the change in societal benefit in the four congestion management cost 
scenarios when the project developer utilises the above-mentioned five different approaches to 
stakeholder engagement. 
Table 4: Impact of stakeholder engagement on societal benefit. 
SHE 
Approach 
Δ 
Project 
cost 
(Mil €) 
Congestion Management Cost Saving 
(Mil €) 
Δ Societal benefit (Mil €) 
  
Scenario 
I 
Scenario 
II 
Scenario 
III 
Scenario 
IV 
Scenario 
I 
Scenario 
II 
Scenario 
III 
Scenario 
IV 
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B 1 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
C 5 3 6 9 12 -2 1 4 7 
D 15 5 10 15 20 -10 -5 0 5 
E 25 10 20 30 40 -15 -5 5 15 
 
From the perspective of societal benefit, such quantification would provide the NRA with greater 
insight while deliberating the trade-off between higher project costs due to stakeholder engagement 
vis-à-vis improvement in societal benefit.  
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On the other hand, the project developer may decide to implement an activity proactively if it sees a 
company-specific benefit. Consider the example of a project developer that is listed on the stock 
market and has a stock price of €50 per share and a market capitalisation of €1 billion. The market 
capitalisation is the product of the number of shares and the price. Based on hypothetical econometric 
analysis, Table 5 presents the impact of positive and negative news articles with regards to stakeholder 
engagement. Negative news has an adverse impact (lower share price) while positive news has a 
favourable effect (increase in share price). The quantification of this aspect allows the project 
developer to decide if (proactively) and how much to invest in stakeholder engagement from the 
perspective of the company reputation and shareholder wealth.  
Table 5: Impact of media coverage 
No of 
negativ
e News 
Articles 
Impact on stock price (%/Article) 
Negative News Positive News 
-1% -5% +1% +5% 
Δ stock price (€/Share) 
1 -0.5 -2.5 0.5 2.5 
2 -1.0 -5.0 1.0 5.0 
3 -1.5 -7.5 1.5 7.5 
 
Δ market capitalisation (€) 
1 - 10,000,000 - 50,000,000 10,000,000 50,000,000 
2 - 20,000,000 - 100,000,000 20,000,000 100,000,000 
3 - 30,000,000 - 150,000,000 30,000,000 150,000,000 
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 Revisiting	incentive	regulation	
To the extent that TSOs experience financial risk as an obstacle to engaging in more activities to raise 
public awareness and trust, it may be necessary to review the economic incentive frameworks 
proposed by the national regulatory authorities and to check their appropriateness to deal with the 
tasks and costs that have been discussed extensively in the second chapter of this report. 
Since the liberalisation of the power sector, the use of ‘incentive regulation’ has become a standard 
practice among European regulators for effective and efficient implementation of grid tasks. In 
economic theory the concept of incentives is explained by Laffont and Martimort (2002) as follows: 
The starting point of incentive theory corresponds to the problem of delegating a task to an 
agent with private information. This private information can be of two types: either the agent 
can take an action unobserved by the principal, the case of moral hazard or hidden action; or 
the agent has some private knowledge about his cost or valuation that is ignored by the 
principal, the case of adverse selection or hidden knowledge. Incentive theory considers when 
this private information is a problem for the principal, and what is the optimal way for the 
principal to cope with it. (p. 4)  
The above-quoted definition can be translated to the power industry as follows. The regulatory 
authority is the principal, and the regulated (monopolistic) network is the agent. Incentives are used 
by the regulator to steer the actions of network companies towards the desired outcome.  
However, two classic assumptions do not hold true in practice. Firstly, it is assumed that the network 
operator’s entire cost is controlled by the regulator as a whole (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). However, 
network operators perform several heterogeneous tasks that each require the application of unique 
regulatory tools, each with advantages and disadvantages that have been discussed in the literature 
(Rious et al., 2008; Saguan et al., 2008; Saplacan, 2008). Secondly, in practice regulators may face 
limitations in their abilities to implement the desired regulatory tool effectively (Glachant et al., 2013).  
In this chapter, incentive regulation to raise public awareness and trust in the context of infrastructure 
development is revisited. We describe how the key regulatory tools of price or revenue cap regulation, 
cost-plus regulation and output-based regulation are connected to the task that is to be regulated and 
to the skills, expertise and resources of the NRA and TSO that are needed to implement the regulatory 
framework. The second section of this chapter explores how the costs of raising public awareness and 
trust can be included in these regulatory instruments.   3.1 Revisiting	incentive	regulation	frameworks	3.1.1 Cost	plus,	price/revenue	cap	and	output-based	regulation	
Glachant et al. (2013) originally identified five key regulatory tools that can be applied for regulating 
the various tasks performed by the system operator.  The five regulatory tools identified are cost-plus 
regulation, price cap regulation, output regulation, a menu of contracts and yardstick regulation. The 
latter two can be considered sophisticated versions of the other tools and are not discussed further in 
this report.  
Cost plus regulation is based on the principle that the regulated firm can recover the costs that are 
incurred for service provided, including a fair rate of return on the capital invested (Joskow, 2008). 
This is a relatively simple tool. The regulator ascertains the costs of the network operator by auditing 
their accounts. These audited costs are then used as a basis for setting the tariff for the regulated 
service.  
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Price or revenue cap regulation can be considered as having a greater complexity compared to cost 
plus regulation. In this tool, the regulator sets a maximum price (or revenue) that the firms can earn 
for providing a service. This price is set for a fixed regulatory period (Joskow, 2008). Thus, the firm is 
incentivised to improve its efficiency by reducing the costs over this period to maximise its profit. 
However, this is not an incentive for the firms to reveal their real costs to the regulator. Therefore, 
the regulator would need to become better at setting a correct reference price/efficiency factor for 
regulating the given task. An error in setting the price cap may lead to windfall profits or crippling 
losses for the network operators 
Output regulation focuses on incentivising improvements in the quality of output that it provides 
(Vogelsang, 2006). The utilisation of such a tool requires a high degree of sophistication in terms of 
regulator’s abilities. In this tool, the regulator links the reward-penalty for the firm to its output based 
on a set of key performance indicators (KPIs). In such regulation, the firm has flexibility in the approach 
that it may use to reach these targets.   3.1.2 Selecting	a	regulatory	instrument	to	regulate	specific	tasks	
Following Glachant et al. (2013), the appropriateness of these tools for regulating a given task can be 
assessed based on a framework consisting of two dimensions. These dimensions are the features of 
the task to be regulated, on the one hand, and the abilities and resources of the regulatory authority, 
on the other hand. The first dimension consists of three criteria, namely, controllability, predictability 
and observability of the task. Figure 5 illustrates the proposed decision tree to align tasks, regulatory 
tools and regulator’s abilities. 
 
Figure 5: Decision tree to align tasks, regulatory tools and regulator's abilities (Based on (Glachant et al., 2013)) 
A task can be controllable if the network operator can largely control and enhance the efficiency of 
the targeted task. This may either be attained by increasing the level of output for the same input or 
by reducing the input required for the given output level. If the firm is unable to control the efficiency 
level of the task, incentive regulation would be ineffective as the efficiency level cannot be predicted. 
In this scenario, a cost-plus approach would be considered as a preferred alternative. On the other 
hand, if the task is controllable, incentive regulation can be utilised for regulating such tasks.  
The second fundamental regulatory characteristic of the task is predictability, i.e. the ability to foresee 
the outcome of the task. If the task is controllable and has a high degree of predictability, a complex 
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incentive mechanism could be implemented, provided that the regulator has a sufficient level of 
expertise. On the other hand, if the predictability of the task is low, a cost-plus approach could be 
applied.   
A task can be considered observable if the impact of the effort by the network operator can be 
reasonably observed ex-post by the regulator and the network operator. However, it is important to 
implement credible key performance indicators within the network operation process to ensure 
effective monitoring. The degree of observability of a task may vary from historical data sets of a single 
firm to data from several comparable firms. If the level of observability is high and the regulator has 
the relevant expertise, it may choose to implement an advanced regulatory tool such as menu 
contracts or yard-stick competition. If the resources of the regulator are limited, the choice of a cost-
plus scheme may be the desirable regulatory framework.  
The current practice in Europe is to apply price cap or revenue cap regulation (20 countries) to the 
TSO expenses to perform its tasks. Several countries (15) apply cost-plus (or rate-of-return) regulation, 
sometimes using a combination with price cap for opex and cost-plus for capex. Output-based 
regulation is applied in few instances, but in Great-Britain and Italy, and recently in Belgium, the 
regulatory frameworks for the transmission level have some elements to reward performance based 
on output proxies (See Table 6). 3.1.3 Alignment	of	regulatory	tools	with	the	resources	of	the	regulator	
Glachant et al. (2013) observe that ‘[t]he practice of regulation is significantly different from its 
theoretical frame. Notably, the textbook model of regulators is always assuming that they have all the 
required abilities to design and implement the theoretically most efficient regulatory regime. However, 
in practice, lowly or badly endowed regulators may not be inclined or able to apply the most complex 
or most innovative regulatory tools to the network operators under their jurisdiction.’ In this section, 
the interdependence of the regulatory tools and the resources of the regulations are discussed in 
greater detail. 
The economic literature that conceived regulatory tools generally assumed that regulators have all 
the necessary skills to choose and administer the most efficient regulatory tool. However, in practice 
regulators may face limitations in their abilities and make decisions in the realm of bounded 
rationality. Thus, the regulator may not have the necessary cognitive, computational and 
administrative abilities required to implement the desired regulatory tool effectively.  Therefore, the 
regulator’s resources in terms of budget, skills and powers may limit the level of sophistication of the 
regulatory tool it may implement. Let us consider the alignment of cost-plus, price/revenue cap and 
output regulation from the perspective of the regulator’s resource requirement (Illustrated in Figure 
6). 
Cost-plus regulation due to its low level of regulatory complexity would require the auditing of the 
TSOs books ex-post and the ability to justify it in a court if required. Eventually, the regulator would 
set the tariff based on the audited costs.  
Price/revenue cap regulation is a forward-looking regulation that entails forecasting expected 
trajectory of efficient cost over the entire regulatory period. There exists a possibility that errors may 
arise if an unexpected change occurs in any of the factors used in calculating the ‘allowed revenue’. 
Thus, such an approach makes setting the correct efficiency factor and reference price complex task. 
Consequently, a higher level of skill is required. 
Output regulation is even more complex than the price/revenue cap and cost-plus approaches. Such 
regulation requires that the regulator defines a performance target explicitly for a given output along 
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with a financial incentive for attaining this target. According to Glachant et al. (2013) ‘[t]his would 
necessitate from the regulator a definition of how the network operator already produces the various 
outputs and how it should be done better. It should also weigh the gains that any improvement of 
these outputs may have for the society as a whole vis-à-vis the value left to the operator in the financial 
incentive. Only under these conditions might the network operator be able to make an efficient 
arbitrage between the costs and the benefits that an operational effort for output performance will 
generate for the society.’ Thus, due to the higher level of complexity, the regulator would also require 
a higher level of resources and skills for administering such a mechanism. 
	
Figure 6: Illustration of incentive regulation tools in terms of the level of resources required by the regulator. 
The assessment presented in ACER (2016) based on a survey of NRAs provides insight into the current 
resources of the regulators across Europe. Significant heterogeneity between member states is 
observed (see Table 6). While some NRAs have less than 12 full-time equivalent staff units (FTEs), 
others, such as Great Britain, have more than 220 FTEs.  
No clear correlation between the FTE and the sophistication and complexity of the incentive regulation 
practice is observed. The larger NRAs do go beyond cost-plus, but the same is observed with some of 
the smaller NRAs, such as Estonia where a price/revenue cap approach is used. Relatively smaller NRAs 
do not apply output regulation except for Belgium, which is classified as a small-mid size NRA. One of 
the reasons that a clear correlation is not observed is that the FTE is a weak proxy for resources 
available for the NRA to regulate a TSO. Some NRAs can focus their resources on the regulation of the 
TSO while others have a broader set of activities to perform. For instance, in Belgium, CREG is not 
responsible for regulating the DSOs. This is also observed by Rious and Rossetto (2018): ‘these 
numbers must be interpreted with caution, as they inevitably reflect the differences in size and 
structure of the national markets, the duty to regulate only electricity or natural gas too, and possibly 
the additional tasks and powers introduced at national level.’  
Table 6: A classification of NRAs based on the total resources for energy regulation in full-time equivalent staff units (FTEs)  
(Source: ACER (2016)) and  current practice of incentive regulation (based on ACER Recommendation 2014/03 (ACER, 2014) 
and own research) 
NRA Size Member State NRA Current incentive regulation practices  
Micro (< 
12 FTE) 
Malta REWS Cost-plus 
Estonia ECA Price/Revenue cap 
Cyprus CERA Cost-plus 
Luxembourg ILR Price/Revenue cap 
Small (12 
-50 FTE) 
Lithuania NCC Price/Revenue cap 
Finland EV Price/Revenue cap 
Denmark DERA Cost-plus 
Latvia PUC Cost-plus, Price/Revenue cap 
Slovenia AGEN-RS Price/Revenue cap 
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Small-
Mid (50 - 
75 FTE) 
Ireland CER Price/Revenue cap 
Croatia HERA Cost-plus 
Slovakia RONI Price/Revenue cap 
Belgium CREG Capex, Price/Revenue cap (opex), Output based 
(some elements since 2017) 
Portugal ERSE Capex, Price/Revenue cap (opex) 
Medium 
(90-140 
FTE) 
Greece RAE Cost-plus 
Netherlands ACM Price/Revenue cap 
France CRE Capex, Price/Revenue cap (opex) 
Austria E-Control Cost-plus 
Sweden EI Price/Revenue cap 
Bulgaria EWRC Cost-plus 
Large-mid 
(170-175 
FTE) 
Italy  AEEGSI Capex, Price/Revenue cap (opex), Output based 
(some elements) 
Spain CNMC Cost-plus 
Large ( > 
220 FTE) 
Czech Rep. ERU Capex, Price/Revenue cap (opex) 
Hungary HEA Price/Revenue cap 
Poland URE Capex, Price/Revenue cap (opex) 
Romania ANRE Price/Revenue cap 
Germany BNetzA Price/Revenue cap 
GB OFGEM Price/Revenue cap, Output based (some elements) 
 3.2 Revisiting	incentive	regulation	in	the	context	of	raising	public	awareness	and	trust	
To the extent that activities to raise public awareness and trust in electricity infrastructure projects 
represent costs that are not fundamentally different from other TSO costs, their costs can be treated 
by the default incentive regulation frameworks implemented by the respective national regulatory 
authorities. 3.2.1 Revisiting	cost-plus	regulation	for	stakeholder	engagement	
The choice for cost plus might be inspired by the simplicity of the regulatory framework for the TSO 
and the NRA. However, in a cost-plus approach, the incentive for the TSOs to control their costs is 
limited. Moreover, there is no strong incentive for innovation. In a cost-plus regime, TSOs face the risk 
that innovation costs are audited as inefficient and thus the TSOs will be less inclined to participate in 
such activities.    
Considering the controversy of each type of activity discussed in Section 2.2, another drawback of this 
approach is that the NRAs may have a bias towards implementing the least controversial activities 
while deciding upon the costs from stakeholder engagement that the firm may recover.  More 
concretely it would imply that project-level activities may be given priority over company level and 
compensation activities.  3.2.2 Revisiting	price-cap	regulation	for	stakeholder	engagement	
Following the logic explained in the previous section, some NRAs may want to apply a price/revenue 
cap to the project stakeholder engagement, corporate stakeholder engagement, and compensation 
activities. This regulatory framework is most effective in the case that the TSO activities improve the 
cost efficiency of the TSO. In other words, as long as the costs of the different stakeholder activities 
are less than the benefits of those activities that are captured by the TSO, the financial incentive 
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inherent in the design of the price cap mechanism alone should be sufficient for TSOs to engage or 
engage more in stakeholder engagement activities as they return an extra profit for the TSO within 
the regulatory period. As discussed in Section 3.1.3, such a regulatory approach entails a greater 
degree of complexity compared to cost-plus but is simpler compared to output regulation.  
A good example of a stakeholder engagement activity being used under the price/revenue cap regime 
to improve cost-efficiency is that of the Elia LIFE+ project (http://www.elia.be/en/safety-and-
environment/Project-Life-Elia). In this project, the newly adopted vegetation management 
approaches in the corridor under and along an overhead line result in lower maintenance costs and 
lower overall costs over the lifetime of the project (see Box 4). The reduction of costs due to this 
activity would improve the performance of the project in terms of cost-efficiency.  
In a price / revenue cap approach, TSOs will prioritise activities that result in the highest direct 
improvement of cost efficiency. The most effective innovation may not be in stakeholder engagement 
if other activities can bring larger cost savings.   
Furthermore, a price/revenue cap approach allows the TSOs to choose the type and combination of 
stakeholder engagement (project, corporate, compensation) that they wish to apply. Considering the 
different levels of controversy for each type of activity discussed in Section 2.2, the company may have 
a bias towards using the least controversial level of stakeholder engagement. 
There are also arguments against the effectiveness of price cap regulation to bring forth innovation in 
stakeholder engagement. As cost-efficiency is the only proxy to assess the performance of the TSO, in 
such a mechanism, the incentive is not targeted towards an activity such as stakeholder engagement 
but rather aggregated. Furthermore, the benefits of the stakeholder engagement activities might be 
dispersed (system benefits) and the part that is captured by the TSO might be too small compared to 
the TSO costs. The benefits might also come much later, spilling over into the next regulatory periods, 
making it uncertain whether the TSO can still capture them. The impact of stakeholder activities may 
not be as clear due to the lack of quantifiable indicators that connect activities and their benefits. In 
the absence of such indicators, project developers may not have sufficient incentives to utilise 
innovative stakeholder engagement activities. For activities that generate dispersed or future 
benefits, cost-plus or output regulation might be better fits. 
Box 4: Innovative Vegetation Management 
The Life Elia-RTE project is aimed at applying innovative vegetation management techniques to 
create ecological corridors along the routes of the high voltage lines in the forests of Belgium and 
France. The project involves project-level stakeholder engagement in the form a co-creation by 
the TSOs and the NGO to innovate the vegetation management of the TSOs. The project was 
provided with a budget of 3 million euros and was co-financed by the European Commission, the 
Walloon Regional government, Elia and RTE to varying degrees. A cost-benefit analysis was 
conducted to assess the impact of this project in 2015 (LIFE Elia-RTE and Elia, 2015). The analysis 
compared the innovative vegetation management methods used in the project with traditional 
vegetation management being implemented by ELIA in Belgium. 
Elia utilises four different activities for traditional vegetation management, namely: Rotary milling, 
manual felling, pollarding trees and pruning of lateral branches. These activities were compared 
with seven ecological restoration actions of the LIFE methods. These actions have been classified 
into four groups, namely: structured edges, open land management (pasturing), natural habitats, 
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and ponds and invasive species. For the cost-benefit analysis, only the first three groups were 
compared.  
The cost-benefit also compares the two modes of vegetation management in terms of ‘other 
impacts’.  The categories of impacts assessed are landscape and nature, social acceptability and 
communication, local embedding, production of new values, practical improvements, 
institutional, administrative and strategic aspects and finally positioning in European legislation. 
Table 7 presents the results of the financial comparison from the CBA presented in the LIFE Elia-
RTE and Elia (2015) report. 
Table 7: Results of the financial comparison from this CBA ((Source: LIFE Elia-RTE and Elia (2015)) 
 
Comparison of traditional 
management / LIFE method With WACC = 5% 
Actions ROI (years) After 30 years After 30 years 
Planted edges 9 1.9 times cheaper 1.4 times cheaper 
Restored edges 3 2.1 times cheaper 1.8 times cheaper 
Pasturage 6 2 times cheaper 1.8 times cheaper 
Pasturage in hard conditions 5 4.7 times cheaper 3.9 times cheaper 
Mowing 6 4.9 times cheaper 2.5 times cheaper 
Natural habitats (heathlands) 3 5.3 times cheaper 3.9 times cheaper 
Natural habitats (peatlands) 9 3 times cheaper 1.8 times cheaper 
 
The report concludes that the innovative vegetation management method leads to a significantly 
shorter time for costs to break even, between 3 to 9 years. Furthermore, it would be 1.4 to 3.9 
times cheaper compared to traditional rotary milling. These cost savings would be directly 
captured by the TSO within the regulatory period under a price/revenue cap regime. 
The analysis claims that the ELIA-LIFE approach would improve societal acceptability of TSOs and 
build trust with concerned stakeholders, facilitate permitting, construction and renovation of 
overhead lines. Finally, the project also integrates European legislation such as Natura 2000 and 
similar directives. 
 3.2.3 Revisiting	output	regulation	for	stakeholder	engagement	
The choice for output regulation depends on the availability of a credible and robust proxy to measure 
the output performance of the TSO. It should not lead to a ‘mark to the marker’ approach by TSOs 
(doing just enough to tick the box and cash the premiums). While it is acknowledged as a very 
attractive option to regulate TSOs, it depends on good proxies. If the proxies are not good then it is 
probably the worst option (as TSOs will do things that do not lead to the desired outcomes). Some 
approaches to output regulation are illustrated in detail. See Box 5 for more details of the three cases 
from Italy, Belgium and GB.  
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During Italy’s fourth regulatory period (2012-2015) a premium remuneration for TSOs that were able 
to meet predefined timelines for the implementation of infrastructure projects. The approach 
consisted of three types of incentives: a premium return on investment for completed projects; a 
premium for work in progress; and, a penalty for projects exceeding their planned commissioning 
date. (See Box 5 for details). Similarly, in Belgium there are dedicated incentives for ‘strategic 
investment projects’. These mainly consist of an additional remuneration for the project. This 
incentive too was linked to the timely completion of the projects.  
As project timeline is the only proxy for performance, such an approach would have some drawbacks 
that are similar to the price/revenue cap approach. Firstly, there is an observability issue due to the 
difficulty in setting the baseline for assessing the delay. Furthermore, as several factors apart from 
stakeholder engagement can have an impact, the project timeline controllability could be difficult.  
OFGEM has adopted an output-based incentive for the development of a high-quality TSO stakeholder 
engagement strategy (which can be seen as project and corporate level engagement activities). In this 
case, a targeted incentive, amounting to 0.5% of their annual allowed revenues, was provided for 
encouraging high-quality stakeholder engagement activities. Such an approach allows the NRA to 
ensure stakeholder engagement by incentivising such activities specifically. Apart from enabling 
greater stakeholder engagement, the approach followed by OFGEM allows the regulator greater 
control over setting the agenda in terms of the vision for this stakeholder engagement. Depending 
upon the output assessment criteria, the incentive could be targeted towards innovation in a desired 
activity or combination of desired stakeholder engagement activities (project / corporate / 
compensation).    
Another innovative practice that Ofgem applies is appointing external experts for assessing the 
stakeholder activities thus mitigating issues arising from the need for greater regulatory abilities for 
administering a complex incentive regulatory approach. Although the approach is dependent on the 
ability of the experts, they can be unbiased (low bias) in their assessment of a particular activity from 
the perspective of its level of controversy and thus encourage innovative approaches.    
 
Box 5: Innovative Incentive Regulation Approaches 
Italy  
In Italy, a premium remuneration was offered for TSOs that were able to meet predefined 
timelines for the implementation of infrastructure projects. Dedicated regulatory frameworks for 
strategic electricity transmission investment were applicable in the fourth regulatory period 
(2012-2015). During this period twenty-five projects received dedicated incentives.  
The approach consisted of three types of incentives as discussed below. A premium return on 
investment for completed projects: a two-percentage-point increase in return on investment was 
provided for twelve months.  
A premium for work in progress: a two-per cent premium was provided for projects that could 
meet predefined annual milestones for authorisation or construction work. The project milestones 
were established by agreement between the project developer and the regulator for each project 
and expressed in monetary value. A ‘threshold’ amounting to at least seventy per cent of the 
accumulated value of the milestones of the previous year is set to assess the progress. A two per 
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cent premium set for all work that has been in progress since 31 December of that previous year 
is provided if the threshold is met.  
A penalty for projects exceeding their planned commissioning date: If the actual commissioning of 
the project is delayed beyond twelve months, the project promoter must pay a lump sum penalty 
in the amount of two per cent calculated on 110 % of the invested capital and pro rata of the 
months that the project is late. In the 5th regulatory period, Italy moved away from this approach. 
For more details please refer to Keyaerts and Meeus (2017, 2015).  
Belgium 
Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation (CREG) offers dedicated incentives for ‘strategic 
investment projects’. These mainly consist of an additional remuneration for the project. Strategic 
investments are primarily aimed at improving EU integration and may be entitled to receive an 
additional mark-up (ELIA, 2016).  
According to Elia (2016): ‘this additional remuneration is calculated as a percentage of the 
cumulative actual amount dispensed (investment amounts are capped per year and per project).’ 
The additional incentive is linked to the OLO rate (free-risk rate). The mark-up is applied at full rate 
if the OLO rate is equal to or below 0.5%. If the OLO is higher, then the mark-up is reduced 
proportionally, capped at 2.16%. The application of the additional remuneration is also 
conditioned to the on-time commissioning of the investment. In case of a delay, a penalty 
amounting to 10 % of the amount earned for the project will be incurred by the project developer. 
For more details on this please refer to Elia (2016). 
Great Britain 
Under the RIIO-ET1 regime, OFGEM has adopted an output-based incentive for the development 
of a high-quality TSO stakeholder engagement strategy (which could be seen as project and 
corporate level engagement activities).  
The OFGEM ‘Electricity Distribution Stakeholder Engagement Incentive Scheme - Guidance Notes’ 
states that ‘The aim of the Stakeholder Engagement Incentive Scheme is to encourage network 
companies to engage proactively with stakeholders to anticipate their needs and deliver a 
consumer-focused, socially responsible and sustainable energy service.’ 
Under this scheme, a transmission operator may receive 0.5% of their annual allowed revenues as 
an additional reward depending upon the assessment of their quality stakeholder engagement 
strategies. Within the category of customer satisfaction, the output is recognised as ‘Effective 
Stakeholder Engagement’. A panel of independent experts is appointed by OFGEM to assess the 
activities of TSOs and allocate the reward; thus, indicating an enlargement of incentive regulation 
to include independent experts (discussed further in Section 5.1.3).  
An overall score out of ten is awarded to each TSO. The incentive available is in proportion to the 
overall score. To illustrate the magnitude of additional income for the TSO, Table 8 provides the 
scores and the financial reward (in GBP) that the three electricity TSOs received. 
Table 8: The scores and financial rewards for electricity TSOs from Stakeholder Engagement Incentive Scheme 2015/16 
 Score Financial Reward 
Scottish Power Electricity Transmission (SPETL) 6.25 £0.75m 
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National Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) 6.25 £3.81m 
Scottish Hydro Electricity Transmission (SHETL) 6.00 £0.68m 
It should also be noted that within the customer satisfaction category there is another output 
called ‘Develop customer/stakeholder satisfaction survey’. It entails an incentive of +/- 1% (for 
more information refer to OFGEM (2012)).  
 3.2.4 Summary	of	Pros	and	Cons	of	the	regulatory	approaches	
Table 9 presents a summary of the pros and cons of applying the different regulatory approaches for 
incentivising stakeholder engagement.  
Table 9: Summary of pros and cons of the regulatory approaches from a stakeholder engagement perspective 
 PROs CONs 
Cost-Plus - Simple to implement 
 
- Information asymmetry between 
TSO and NRA not addressed 
- No incentive for cost control or 
innovation 
- NRA bias towards choosing the 
least controversial stakeholder 
engagement level 
Price/Revenue 
cap 
- Relatively Simple to implement 
- Incentivises cost efficiency 
- No explicit incentive for enabling 
stakeholder engagement activities 
- Company bias towards choosing 
the least controversial stakeholder 
engagement level 
Output (BE/IT) - Incentivises on-time commissioning - No explicit incentive for enabling 
stakeholder engagement activities 
- Difficulty in establishing a baseline 
for measuring the delays may 
cause observability issues. 
- The possibility of controllability 
issue as delays may be due to 
several factors 
- Company bias towards choosing 
the least controversial stakeholder 
engagement level 
Output (GB) - The explicit incentive for 
stakeholder engagement 
- (neutral) Expert evaluation 
encourages innovation by reducing 
the level of controversy bias. 
- Evaluation is dependent on the 
quality of external experts 
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 Enlarging	incentive	regulation		
The application of incentive regulation is generally understood as a regulatory authority providing an 
incentive framework to natural monopolies for performing a given regulated task efficiently and in the 
interest of society. The application of incentive regulation for TSOs to raise public awareness and trust 
in infrastructure development is discussed in detail in the previous chapter. However, incentive 
regulation may be expanded to encompass other relevant stakeholders such as other authorities, the 
public at large or independent experts.  
Enlarging incentive regulation can be approached in two ways: one way is through the inclusion of 
other actors than the energy regulator to help regulate the TSO; the other is through the consideration 
of incentives for other stakeholders than the TSO. These two forms of enlarging incentive regulation 
are explored in the two subsequent sections of this chapter, showcasing the ongoing innovations in 
both enlargement dimensions.  4.1 Enlarging	 incentive	 regulation	 to	 include	 other	regulators		
Obtaining public acceptance is a challenging task consisting of several skills dimensions such as 
stakeholder engagement, communication and negotiation skills, partnership building, and non-market 
strategy development. For a long time in the energy industry, these skills were of lesser importance 
and thus less present within TSO and NRA organisations as the traditional focus of the business has 
been on cost-effective operational excellence in a business-to-business (B2B) context among energy-
sector professionals.  
At present, stakeholders are more demanding and self-aware because they have better access to 
information, are better educated and have access to technology that makes it easier to organise 
interest groups. TSOs that are investing in transmission infrastructure projects have to deal directly 
with the public, who are not energy-sector professionals, to ensure public acceptance of their projects. 
In other words, the TSO context is enlarging from a pure B2B to one including business-to-citizen 
(B2Ci)12 relationships.  
In this enlarged context, the benefit of and need for a different set of competencies, skills and 
expertise is clear. Nowadays, even conducting activities that have been important from a much earlier 
time, such as spatial planning and environmental planning, require the TSOs and NRAs to innovate. 
Competencies, skills and expertise can be brought in to assist NRAs by enlarging incentive regulation 
to include other actors to help guide project promoters in their activities to raise public awareness 
and trust in infrastructure development. This study distinguishes three groups of other regulators, 
which are government agencies and authorities, the public and organised stakeholder groups, and 
third-party experts. The costs for TSOs that may originate from input from these other regulators 
remain a matter for the energy regulator to decide.  
Before describing ongoing innovation in the context of enlarging incentive regulation, it should be 
highlighted that even though different actors can help with regulating the TSO, by steering it in the 
desired direction, such steering can be effective only if there is alignment between the interests of 
these regulators. Well-intentioned but misaligned efforts may have a counterproductive effect that 
could lead to a project being delayed or cancelled, rather than speeding up the development process. 
Examples of such misalignment are decisions that defend opposing interests and decisions that are 
                                                             
12 Adapted from the concept business-to-consumer business (B2C). 
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made without being fully aware of the consequences for another regulator. The decision of one 
regulator to implement undergrounding of a cable may, for instance, imply a multiplication of the total 
cost of the project that is borne eventually by all energy consumers. This aspect becomes even more 
complicated due to the different layers of regulators that exist at the EU, national and local levels. 4.1.1 Including	other	government	agencies	and	authorities		
A number of government agencies and authorities are involved in several stages of the development 
process of infrastructure projects. In that process, they also shape the public acceptance activities in 
which the project promoters engage. Here, two typical cases of involvement of other authorities are 
discussed. 
The first type is the government as law-making authority that adopts legal frameworks. These legal 
frameworks must be executed by the project promoters and NRAs. Several countries have for instance 
a legal framework for compensation costs. As discussed in Chapter 2, compensation is controversial 
from an energy regulation viewpoint as it implies a redistribution of welfare. The government, as the 
elected representatives of society, has the legitimacy to decide on a compensation framework. 
In France, the compensation framework is established in the public service contract between the state 
and the TSO (See Box 6). This ‘contract’ requires that RTE conceives a plan d’accompagnement de 
projet which aims to bring sustainable economic development to affected regions. For lines of 400kV 
or over, the community payments are 10% of the investment cost for the line (coût d’investissement 
pour des lignes nouvelles), and for line strength of 225kV, the compensation is set at 8% of the 
investment cost for the line. In accordance with the French legislation, the management of the 
compensation is determined by local stakeholder committees set up by the regional government. The 
compensation amount and activities are decided based on the negotiations between the TSO, 
committees and local authorities (RTE, 2017).  
 
Box 6: The French compensation framework 
The French compensation framework is set by the contrat de service public entre l’Etat et RTE 
(most recent version of 5 May 2017). Following the contract RTE’s 24th commitment reads: 
Associer à tout projet de création de ligne aérienne de 400kV, 225kV et haute tension du réseau 
public de transport un plan d’accompagnement de projet (PAP) dont l’objectif est de contribuer au 
développement économique durable des territoirer traversés. Pour répondre à des situations 
exceptionnelles, RTE pourra proposer à l’autorité administrative l’extension de ce dispositif à 
d’autres types d’ouvrage. L’Etat fixera alors, après avis de la CRE, les modalités de celui-ci dans 
l’objectif de trouver le meilleur compromis entre les intérêts du territoire et ceux du service public 
de l’énergie 
 
In Italy, there is a regulatory framework that explicitly allows the consideration of possible 
compensation costs in the cost-benefit analysis of a project. The compensation framework is 
determined by the State and the Regions that have to ensure the balance of interests in the context 
of establishing infrastructure locations. To balance the impact of infrastructure that is concentrated 
in a region, compensatory measures may be included (See Box 7).  
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Box 7: The Italian compensation framework 
The Italian legal framework is set by Article 1(4)(f) of Law 239/2004 as quoted below; the 
underlined passage refers to the possible compensation measures. 
4. Lo Stato e le regioni, al fine di assicurare su tutto il territorio nazionale i livelli essenziali delle 
prestazioni concernenti l'energia nelle sue varie forme e in condizioni di omogeneità sia con 
riguardo alle modalità di fruizione sia con riguardo ai criteri di formazione delle tariffe e al 
conseguente impatto sulla formazione dei prezzi, garantiscono: 
(...) 
f) l'adeguato equilibrio territoriale nella localizzazione delle infrastrutture energetiche, nei limiti 
consentiti dalle caratteristiche fisiche e geografiche delle singole regioni, prevedendo eventuali 
misure di compensazione e di riequilibrio ambientale e territoriale qualora esigenze connesse agli 
indirizzi strategici nazionali richiedano concentrazioni territoriali di attività, impianti e 
infrastrutture ad elevato impatto territoriale, con esclusione degli impianti alimentati da fonti 
rinnovabili; 
 
The compensation framework in Germany is established by the ‘Stromnetzentgeltverordnung’ and 
sets a limit of 40,000 euro per kilometre of 380 kV overhead line. The framework is implemented by 
means of agreements for payments between TSOs and affected communities (See Box 8).  
 
Box 8: The German compensation framework 
The German framework is set by Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV) §5(4). The original text 
reads: 
(4) Soweit Betreiber von Elektrizitätsversorgungsnetzen auf Grundlage einer Vereinbarung mit 
Städten oder Gemeinden oder Interessenverbänden der Städte und Gemeinden Zahlungen an 
Städte oder Gemeinden, auf deren Gebiet eine Freileitung auf neuer Trasse errichtet wird, 
entrichtet, sind die Zahlungen des letzten abgeschlossenen Geschäftsjahres nach Maßgabe des 
Satzes 2 als Kostenposition bei der Bestimmung der Netzkosten nach § 4 zu berücksichtigen. Eine 
Berücksichtigung nach Satz 1 ist nur für die Fälle des § 43 Nummer 1 des 
Energiewirtschaftsgesetzes bei tatsächlicher Inbetriebnahme der Leitung und nur bis zu der 
angegebenen Höhe einmalig möglich: 1. Höchstspannungsfreileitungen ab 380 Kilovolt 40 000 
Euro pro Kilometer; 2. Gleichstrom-Hochspannungsfreileitungen ab 300 Kilovolt 40 000 Euro pro 
Kilometer. 
 
In 2012, the Irish government released a policy statement on the strategic importance of transmission 
and other energy infrastructure (DCENR, 2012) (See Box 9). In line with this policy, the state-owned 
TSO EirGrid has developed a framework for implementing ‘community gains mechanisms’ as part of 
its Grid 25 Programme. There are two elements for providing compensation: 1) Community Fund and 
2) Proximity Payments. 
The size of the community fund was based on the length and voltage of the line. (110kV: €15,000 per 
km, 220 kV: €30,000 per km, 400 kV: €40,000 per km). New transmission (sub)stations in rural regions 
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are considered as 1km length line for the given voltage. The proximity payments are based on the 
distance from the infrastructure (up to 200 meters). The maximum proximity payment of €30,000 at 
50m (to €5000 at 200m) from a 400kV infrastructure element and the lowest would be €2,000 for a 
residential building located at a distance of 200m from a 110kV infrastructure element (EirGrid, 2014, 
n.d.; RGI, 2016).  
 
Box 9: The Irish compensation framework 
The Irish governments’ policy document ‘Government Policy Statement on the Strategic 
Importance of Transmission and Other Energy Infrastructure’ states the following:  
‘The Government reaffirms, in conclusion, the imperative need for development and renewal of our 
energy networks, in order to meet both economic and social policy goals. The planning process 
provides the necessary framework for ensuring that all necessary standards are met and that 
comprehensive statutory and non-statutory consultation is built into the process. 
We acknowledge the need for social acceptance and the appropriateness of exploring ways of 
building community gain considerations into project planning and budgeting. Delivering long-
lasting benefits to communities is an important way of achieving public acceptability for 
infrastructure. 
The State network companies are mandated to plan their developments in a safe efficient and 
economic manner. They are also required to address and mitigate human, environmental and 
landscape impacts, in delivering the best possible engineering solutions.’ 
 
The second case is agencies and authorities that play a role in the permitting process. All infrastructure 
projects must acquire clearances from authorities that oversee spatial planning and the environment. 
The consent-obtaining procedures of these authorities often involve obligations to run project-level 
stakeholder engagement activities, such as to inform and consult the public, and may include 
(financial) compensation rules such as compensation for impact on nature. In most countries these 
authorities are separated from the energy regulator, meaning that the NRA and the other agencies 
have to coordinate to some extent their decisions or at least be mutually aware of the impact of their 
decisions. 
The German NRA, Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) provides an exceptional example as in their case, the 
competences of energy regulator, coordinator of stakeholder engagement, and one-stop-shop 13 
(Mituta, 2014) for permitting for projects of common interest are all in one hand. This may help to 
improve alignment to some extent even though the competencies are organised in different 
departments.   4.1.2 Including	the	public	and	organised	stakeholder	groups	
Non-governmental organisations, public interest associations and related stakeholders play a key role 
in stakeholder engagement and provide innovative solutions in their area of expertise. Such entities 
                                                             
13 In the context of the projects of common interest, the Ten-E regulation (347/2013) of the European Union 
mandate ‘The establishment of a competent authority or authorities integrating or coordinating all permit 
granting processes (‘one-stop shop’) should reduce complexity, increase efficiency and transparency and help 
enhance cooperation among Member States. Upon their designation, the competent authorities should be 
operational’ (European Parliament, 2013). 
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can complement the NRA in day-to-day oversight of the activities. NGOs and the public can act as a 
check for the stakeholder engagement process. This can also be a factor in encouraging greater 
transparency regarding transmission infrastructure development. There are several examples of good 
experiences with combined planning and cost discussion involving NGOs and the public. Here, three 
examples in which the public and stakeholder groups have been involved to ‘regulate’ project 
developers are discussed. 
The first example deals with establishing reasonable costs of non-financial compensation measures. 
The British TSO, National Grid, invited the public to assess the value of different options to reduce the 
visual impact of infrastructure projects; in other words, the public helped the TSO to conduct a 
willingness-to-pay study that was fed into the regulatory process (National Grid, 2012). The eventual 
aim of this research was to gain insight about the size of the fund to be dedicated for mitigation 
methods during the RIIO-T1 period, and the British regulator made its own assessment of the study 
and eventually set rules for the regulatory framework regarding a fund for reducing visual impacts.  
This study may thus be classified as a mix of a project-level stakeholder engagement activity and a 
compensation-related activity. 
The second example deals with the inclusion of NGOs in incentive regulation. The Belgian TSO, ELIA 
commissioned a report from a group of NGOs14 with expertise in bird and nature protection. The 
report focused on ‘Reducing bird mortality caused by high and very high voltage power lines in 
Belgium’ (Derouaux et al., 2012). Thus, the NGOs were able to provide solutions to the issue while at 
the same time fulfilling the stakeholder engagement goals of the TSO.  
A third example of including the public and other stakeholder groups in regulating the TSO is the LIFE 
Elia-RTE project. The project involves project-level stakeholder engagement in the form of a 
cooperation between the TSOs and the NGOs to innovate in the vegetation management of the TSOs. 
The activity also envisaged involvement of NGOs in the activities such as improving the bio-diversity 
in project corridors. The cost-benefit analysis conducted indicated significant cost savings arising from 
the use of innovative vegetation management. Thus, in a price cap regime, the involvement of NGOs 
would aid the TSO in improving its cost efficiency.  4.1.3 Including	independent	experts		
The third kind of regulator that may be included in incentive regulation are independent experts to 
help with very specific tasks. The NRAs may accomplish these tasks in two ways. Firstly, they may be 
accomplished in-house. The NRAs may develop the necessary skill sets within their own organisation 
by hiring or retraining staff. On the other hand, in several cases, the NRAs opt to hire independent 
external experts with the necessary knowledge required for accomplishing the given task.  
An example of the involvement of independent experts in enforcing output regulation comes from 
OFGEM in the UK. Under the RIIO-ET1 regime, a transmission operator may receive 0.5% additional 
allowed annual revenue depending upon the assessment of their quality stakeholder engagement 
strategies. Thus directly linking stakeholder engagement to monetary incentives for the TSO  (OFGEM, 
2017a, 2017b). 
The companies are required to provide a demonstration to the effect that: 1) a robust public 
engagement strategy has been implemented; 2) the transmission system operator must provide 
outcomes of the public engagement process. The performance of the TSOs is assessed, annually, by a 
                                                             
14 The NGOs were Aves/Natagora, Natuurpunt, INBO and Vogelbescherming Vlaanderen 
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panel of independent experts. The panel then awards a score out of ten for the TSO. The revenues of 
the company will be adjusted in accordance with their scores (OFGEM, 2017a, 2017b).  
Project promoters may also engage independent experts to assist in self-regulation of the companies. 
An innovative approach utilised by some TSOs is allowing external agencies to audit corporate level 
performance targets. This can, for instance, be accomplished by being included in sustainability 
indices. The Dow Jones Sustainability Index is an example of such an index.   
Such indices provide a way of benchmarking for these TSOs to compare their performance with the 
best organisations in terms of sustainability and it offers a reputational incentive for improving their 
performance and following through on, for instance, a stated social mission. Additionally, being part 
of such indices may also have a positive impact on the corporate image of the company. An example 
of a TSO that is included on several sustainability indices is Terna (Terna, 2016).   4.2 Enlarging	 incentive	 regulation	 to	 consider	 incentives	for	other	stakeholders	
In this section, practices of offering incentives to other stakeholders in the context of infrastructure 
development and the default course of action in the absence of agreement between project 
developers and the stakeholders are discussed. These two elements form the second dimension of 
enlarging incentive regulation.  4.2.1 Innovative	incentives	for	the	public	
In the context of compensations, implementing an innovative incentive mechanism may lead to a 
more efficient outcome in comparison to a standard compensation method. These incentives would 
be directed towards the public rather than the project developer. To illustrate this alternative a 
parallel can be drawn from the airline industry. Airlines often use innovative instruments of congestion 
management on overbooked flights to minimise their costs of rebooking passengers.  
On an overbooked flight, one may consider denying the last passengers a seat on the flight. This would 
entail a certain tangible cost to the airline for rerouting these passengers and some intangible costs 
that may arise from the inconvenience caused to the passenger. On the other hand, some airlines 
employ an auction where compensation is paid to passengers willing to rebook. In such a situation, 
the decision rests with the passenger on whether to forfeit his right to a seat and at what price. 
Eventually, such a situation may lead to a more efficient outcome as compared to the default option 
(first come, first served). Of course, it should also be noted that airlines keep the money that is paid 
by passengers that do not show up for the flight, thus recovering part (if not all) of the additional costs 
required for congestion management.    
The default option for a TSO is then to decide the network topology for the new line and to follow it 
up ex-post with project-level stakeholder engagement. Eventually, negotiated payments in cash or 
kind to individuals or communities can be considered as an example of standard compensation 
methods. Generally, in such situations, the project developer engages with the affected persons after 
fixing the project parameters to build support for the project. 
As an alternative, incentivising the stakeholders to welcome transmission infrastructure projects in 
their vicinity may provide a more efficient outcome. For example, such an incentive scheme could take 
the form of a tender or auction of project packages consisting of a combination of the electricity 
infrastructure project, one or more community projects that are financially supported by project 
promoter (e.g. a school, or a hospital) and financial compensations. One could imagine a community 
being offered the choice between an overhead line close by and a new hospital, or an overhead line 
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further away (e.g. built on rougher terrain that makes it more expensive for the project developer) 
without the hospital. It can be noted that the inclusion of other regulators (as discussed in 4.1) may 
be relevant in such a case. The NRA may not have the requisite skill to accurately assess the overall 
benefit of the combination of a transmission line and a community project. Or it might not have the 
mandate to consider the welfare effects of non-energy projects. In such a scenario it is recommended 
that other regulators are involved, such as government authorities or experts to help with the 
assessment and the decision making (or even decision taking).   
In 2013, Tennet began a pilot project to allow financial participation (15% of investment sum) of 
affected citizens in the investment for the ‘west-coast line’ in northern Germany via a financial 
instrument called citizens’ bonds. Preference (up to 10,000 euro) was given to citizens living within a 
5KM radius. It is reported that 100 households participated in the bonds. Tennet’s approach can also 
be revisited as an attempt at utilising innovative incentives for citizens. In this case, by investing in the 
bonds, it can be said that the citizens have a (monetary) interest in the successful completion of the 
project. At the same time, for the TSO, such an approach not only mitigates public opposition but also 
provides another source of project financing. This was a pilot project that has not been repeated. 
Currently no assessment of this pilot project is publicly available. 
Another example of innovative public engagement comes from France. In 2016, RTE began using a 
crowdfunding approach for improving public acceptance of the new power line. RTE launched a 
webpage (www.mesprojetsterritoriaux.fr) in collaboration with the crowd-funding website ULULE. 
Citizens can submit their project proposals on the website, and pre-selected projects are uploaded for 
crowd-funding. When the crowd-financing goal is reached RTE co-finances the project. This innovative 
approach allows greater public involvement in projects that would receive PAP (Plan 
d’Accompagnement de Projet) as well as supporting these projects financially. For more details on this 
approach, please see RTE (2018b). 
This aspect is novel and has so far not been extensively researched. Therefore, further research on 
developing incentive mechanisms for stakeholders is recommended. Furthermore, such innovative 
approaches to stakeholder engagement could be tested by applying them to pilot projects to assess 
their effectiveness and impact on social welfare. 4.2.2 Default	option	on	non-agreement		
In most situations, the application of an effective stakeholder engagement strategy would lead to 
resolution of all disputes and completion of the project. In this case, there may be some eventual 
additional costs involved for the project promoters. However, there may be situations where 
agreement cannot be reached between the TSO and the stakeholders. Such scenarios may threaten 
the eventual development of the project with the worst-case scenario being the cancellation of the 
project.  
To deal with such eventualities, in most countries, some type of legal framework is in existence that 
would allow expropriation of private property for the projects that are deemed critical to the larger 
interest of society15. The expropriation of land may be done by the government itself, or the developer 
may be mandated to exercise such rights. First, in Box 10, the case of Sweden is presented, where in 
case of a disagreement between the landowners and the TSO, the Swedish mapping, cadastral and 
land registration authority (Lantmäteriet) decides about land acquisition.  
                                                             
15 It should be noted that depending on the legal framework of a country, property owners may have the option 
to take a legal recourse to oppose this action.  
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Box 10: Default compensation method for landowners in Sweden (Svenska Kraftnet) 
The Swedish constitution (Constitution, Chapter 2, Article 18), allows expropriation of land to 
‘satisfy pressing public interests’ with payment of appropriate compensation. The compensations 
offered are based on the principles set in the Swedish Expropriation Act. The TSO can get access 
to the land based on the Utility Easement Act that grants it a special status similar to that of 
compulsory acquisition (Norell, 2008). However, in most cases (approximately 95%) a voluntary 
easement agreement is reached based on compensation (Norell, 2008). If the landowner and 
Svenska Krafnet do not reach an agreement, the TSO will make an application to the Swedish 
mapping, cadastral and land registration authority (Lantmäteriet) for a resolution. Lantmäteriet, 
based on their due process, would then decide upon the matter. 
According to the public website of the Swedish TSO Svenska kraftnät (2015), the default 
compensation offered to landowners is summarised as follows. If a power line is built on the land, 
a lump sum offer of 25% premium on top of the reduced value of the land (due to the line) is made 
to the landowners for the perpetual leasing of the land. Apart from the lump sum compensation, 
any damage during the construction of the line is repaired by the developer. Six types of 
compensations (excluding compensation of legal costs in certain cases) are specified by the TSO. 
A land lease agreement is signed between the landowner and the TSO to build and manage the 
transmission line of the land. 
In case of transmission infrastructure projects, in some countries, the TSO may be mandated to 
conduct this activity to complete the project. An example is that of the UK where National Grid is 
mandated to exercise such rights for their projects. However, exercising this right may not be in the 
best interests of the TSO as this may have a long-term negative impact on the public opinion of the 
company in exchange for a short-term gain. Thus, in the future, the TSO may face even greater 
difficulty while engaging stakeholders on other projects. In Box 11, the case of the UK is described in 
greater detail.  
Box 11: Default option on non-agreement in Great Britain 
In GB, the TSO National Grid is mandated to exercise the right granted in the development consent 
order to expropriate land for development of the new electricity transmission assets.  The process 
that is required to be followed regarding the acquisition of land is explained in National Grid 
(2013). The following paragraph from the document details the expropriation procedure.  
‘Where National Grid has been unable to obtain a voluntary Agreement from a third party, 
following the grant of a Development Consent Order for new electricity transmission assets, 
National Grid will seek to acquire the relevant land or land rights over the relevant land through 
the compulsory acquisition powers granted to it through the Development Consent Order. A copy 
of the Order and a compulsory acquisition notice will be served by National Grid on the relevant 
third party, and the notice will be posted on or near to the relevant land. Generally, following the 
processes for compulsory acquisition of land and land rights under both Part 1 of the Compulsory 
Purchase Act 1965 and the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, National Grid will implement the 
compulsory acquisition provisions of the Order by serving a ‘notice to treat’ or, if the Order 
provides, by a ‘general vesting declaration’. Compensation would then be calculated and, if due, 
payable to the relevant third party in accordance with the relevant provisions of the land 
compensation legislation.’  
- Guidance on Land Rights for New Electricity Transmission Assets – National Grid (2013). 
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 Conclusions	and	recommendations	for	future	work.		
This research reviews and assesses the possibility of enlarging incentive regulation to improve public 
awareness and trust in infrastructure development.  
Project developers and experts confirm that obstacles to effective stakeholder engagement continue 
to exist, and three of these are discussed extensively in this report. The first key obstacle is the 
framework offering economic incentives to engage in these activities. The second key obstacle is the 
internal TSO procedures, organisation and culture, which may not be appropriate for the complexity 
of the task at hand. The third key obstacle is the legitimacy of the activities engaged in by the project 
developer. These three obstacles can exist simultaneously, in various combinations. 
The review of the industry literature and the interviews with project developers show that project 
developers are involved in various stakeholder engagement activities. These activities can be classified 
into three categories: corporate level stakeholder engagement, project-level stakeholder engagement 
and compensations. It is important to note that these practices are not mutually exclusive and 
developers may use a combination of the three approaches.  
The analysis of the available literature and expert sources makes clear that there exists a fundamental 
gap in terms of empirical work or assessment regarding the impact of the aforementioned activities. 
Empirical work regarding stakeholder engagement activities, on the one hand, and the performance 
of the project developers, e.g. in terms of developing infrastructure, on the other hand, requires a 
robust econometric analysis.  The availability of this information would substantiate the debate and 
help both TSOs and NRAs in dealing with economic incentives for such stakeholder engagement 
activity. Furthermore, a better understanding of the impact would give greater confidence to 
regulators for incentivising such activities. This information should be made publicly available. In this 
research, some possible independent and dependent variables that could be used for conducting such 
a quantitative analysis are conceptually discussed along with the limitations of such an approach. It is 
recommended that further research be conducted using econometric analysis for developing 
indicators to quantify costs and benefits from stakeholder engagement activities.  It is also recognised 
that an econometric analysis will take time. NRAs can already take steps based on the other two 
recommendations from this study in the meantime. 
In the context of the incentive regulation framework, three regulatory tools to raise public awareness 
and trust in infrastructure development are analysed: price or revenue cap regulation, cost-plus 
regulation and output-based regulation. Each of these approaches has its pros and cons. Furthermore, 
an interdependence exists between the level of sophistication of the regulatory tool and the resources 
and skills required to design and implement it. It is clear that NRAs have already started to use 
different combinations of these tools. However, it is too early to identify which approach will work 
best for stakeholder engagement activities. NRAs may have to experiment to some extent and come 
to a functional regulatory framework over time, learning what works best in the specific context of 
the country. Some of the more innovative incentive regulation approaches appear to be very 
promising such as in Great Britain. However, they require significant regulatory sophistication in terms 
of resources and skills for effective implementation. Therefore, it is important that there is an 
alignment between the regulatory tools utilised and resources available for the NRA to administer 
these tools.  
Furthermore, two avenues for expanding incentive regulation frameworks for stakeholder 
engagement are explored. The first approach is to include other actors than the energy regulator to 
guide the TSO to efficiently raise public awareness and build trust in the development of complex 
projects. These actors can be classified into three categories, namely: government agencies and 
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authorities, public and organised stakeholder groups, and independent experts. The other approach 
is to design and implement, by the TSOs and NRAs, innovative incentive mechanisms for stakeholders.  
Therefore, to expand incentive regulations, NRAs and TSOs will need to continue to be innovative in 
their approach towards stakeholder engagement. It is recommended that further research is 
undertaken on developing and pilot testing innovative approaches to enlarge incentive regulation for 
stakeholder engagement with the aim of turning them into common practice and moving on from 
pilot projects.  The key recommendations for future work are summarised in Box 13. 
 
Box 13: Key conclusions and recommendations for future work. 
Conclusions: 
Conclusion 1: Stakeholder opposition is a pressing problem. Obstacles to effective stakeholder 
engagement and to the implementation of such measures continue to exist.  
Conclusion 2: Project developers are involved in several stakeholder engagement activities; 
however, such stakeholder engagement activities need to be mainstreamed and move beyond the 
pilot project stage. 
Conclusion 3: A fundamental gap exists in terms of empirical work or assessment regarding the 
impact of stakeholder engagement activities. 
Conclusion 4: The incentive regulatory tools that were assessed each have pros and cons.  
Furthermore, there is dependence between the level of sophistication of the regulatory tool and 
the resources and skills required to design and implement it.  
Conclusion 5: NRAs have already started to use different combinations of these tools. However, it 
is too early to identify which approach will work best for stakeholder engagement activities. 
Conclusion 6: Incentive regulation can be enlarged to include other regulators and to consider 
incentives for other stakeholders. 
Recommendations for future work: 
Recommendation 1: Econometric analysis should be conducted to support the quantification of 
costs and benefits of stakeholder engagement activities. Furthermore, this information should be 
made publicly available by the project promoters to enable analyses by either NRAs or third 
parties. 
Recommendation 2: Share and implement best practices among NRAs on innovative ways to 
incentivise TSOs to engage in state of the art stakeholder engagement approaches. 
Recommendation 3: NRAs should experiment with enlarging incentive regulation by considering 
a role for other regulators and by developing ways to incentivise other stakeholders. 
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 Annex	I:	ENTSO-E	SDC	Survey	
 Survey	report		ENTSO-E	 SDC	 survey	 on	 enlarging	incentive	 regulation	 to	 improve	public	awareness	 and	 trust	 in	 infrastructure	development	–	FSR	study	
 
September 2017, ENTSO-E SDC task force for FSR study 
 
ENTSO-E SDC TF leader: Tomasz Okraszewski (Transnet BW) 
Survey design: Leonardo Meeus (FSR), Nico Keyaerts (FSR) 
Rapporteur: Nico Keyaerts 
Do not cite or circulate without the authors’ permission 
Responses  
 
11 responses coming from 
Belgium France Poland 
Croatia Germany (2) Sweden 
Denmark Macedonia Switzerland 
Finland   
 
Context of the survey 
 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) study, in collaboration with ENTSO-E and RGI, on enlarging 
incentive regulation to improve public awareness and trust in infrastructure development was 
announced at and warmly welcomed by the Copenhagen Infrastructure Forum in June 2017. One of 
the objectives of the study is to take stock of the ongoing innovation in stakeholder activities by project 
promoters. 
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Therefore, a survey has been organised by FSR and ENTSO-E with the aim of tapping into the collective 
memory and knowledge of the electricity TSO community and collecting the experiences with public 
acceptance activities. 
TSOs engage more and more in activities like branding, communication, public relations and 
stakeholder engagement to build trust with the public at large; good relations with all stakeholders 
support your business, whereas bad relations can be detrimental to it. 
The first part of this survey deals with the recent experience in of TSOs regarding the abovementioned 
activities of branding, communication, public relations, stakeholder engagement (including 
compensation activities).  
The second part of this survey deals with the motivation that is driving these activities. Motivation 
can be found as part of a corporate mission, strategy or culture, it can be the desire to avoid repetition 
of a past negative experience, or there could be financial or reputational incentives that encourage to 
engage in the aforementioned activities? 
The third part of the survey deals with the organisational setup for undertaking these activities. Are 
these activities important at the project-level, or at the corporate level? Are they organised at country 
level or on a regional/local level? Are all skills and competences present in-house or are some activities 
outsourced? What are the budgets spent and resources invested on these activities? What is the 
relative importance of the above activities and how is performance tracked? 
1. Taking stock of activities 
Three groups of TSO activities to raise public awareness and build trust in infrastructure development 
can be identified in the survey: project-level stakeholder engagement, corporate level stakeholder 
engagement, and compensation activities. 
1.A. Project-level stakeholder engagement 
Examples of project-level stakeholder engagement activities include local dialogue forums, 
stakeholder workshops, information campaigns (at early stage of project development), information 
stands and fairs, project branding, pedagogic campaigns, public consultation of network planning, 
project advisory board. 
1.B. Corporate level stakeholder engagement 
Examples of corporate level stakeholder engagement activities include employee branding campaigns, 
social missions and CSR activities, company branding, educational campaigns on electricity 
transmission, corporate level communication, good neighbour campaign, stakeholder alliances. 
1.C. Compensation activities 
Examples of compensation activities include policies for compensation of home/land owners, policies 
for visual impact compensation, supporting community projects. 
Table 1: summary of responses on activities 
 
PROJECT CORPORATE COMPENSATIONS 
BE (Belgium) Early stage information, 
awareness creation 
methodology 
Employee branding 
campaign, cultural 
change programme 
(internal) 
Policy for home owner, 
policy for EMF, policy for 
visual 
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DE (Germany) Local dialogue forums Social mission, CSR, PR 
 
DK (Denmark) Stakeholder workshops Employee branding  
FI (Finland) Information campaigns Branding  
FR (France) Project branding 
(INELFE), pedagogic 
campaign EMF, citizen 
jury to do co-design, 
public consult of regional 
plan 
‘Power grid of tomorrow’ 
campaign 
8%-10% of project budget 
for community projects 
HR (Croatia) Communication experts Branding, corporate level 
communication 
 
MK (Macedonia)    
PL (Poland) Information campaigns Brand building, 
stakeholder alliances, 
good neighbour 
campaign 
 
SE (Sweden)   Property loss 
compensation 
CH (Switzerland) Early consultations, info 
stands and fairs, project 
advisory board 
  
Disclaimer: the survey aimed at getting an indication of the range of activities that TSOs engage in and 
does not claim to be an exhaustive listing of all activities that the respondents engage in 
 
2. Taking stock of resources (budgets, staff) invested by TSOs 
 
Out of the eleven TSOs that replied to the survey: 
- 3 indicated to have a staffing of less than 10 FTE; 5 indicated to have staffing of more than 20 (up 
to approximately 45) * 
- 6 indicated to have budgets in the range of a few million euro or 0-2 % of project budgets or 
general expenses budgets** 
*Caveat: survey respondents often indicated the numbers are best guesses as resources are dispersed 
in the TSO organizations (usually a mix centralized resources in corporate level departments and 
decentralized resources in regional and/or project based teams) 
** Caveat: budgets for compensation activities are treated separately 
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Table 2: summary of responses on resources 
 
STAFF BUDGET 
BE (Belgium) 43 A few million, +/- 0.5% allowed revenue 
DE (Germany) / Few million at corporate level (but not allowed sponsoring or 
pure image branding etc.) 
DK (Denmark) 20  / 
FI (Finland) 6 Approximately 1 million 
FR (France) / Few millions at corporate level, appr. 5% of project budgets for 
project-level and 8-10% of project budget for compensations 
HR (Croatia) 3-4 Appr. 2% general expenses budget 
MK (Macedonia) 1 / 
PL (Poland) 14 / 
SE (Sweden) / / 
CH (Switzerland) 20 Very small relative to project budgets (but large benefits) 
 
 
3. Other observations 
 
On incentives for TSOs to engage in activities to raise public awareness and trust: few respondents 
answered positively on the presence of dedicated financial or reputational incentives to engage in 
those activities 
 
On incentives for other stakeholders to support infrastructure project development: there were no 
examples included in the responses of incentives being given to other stakeholders 
 
On costs and benefits of stakeholder activities: the respondents did not share quantitative (financial) 
information with respect to the possible costs of limited public support and benefits of stakeholder 
activities to raise support; the respondents referred to project time delays as a proxy for costs. 
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Appendix: Survey questions 
 
SDC Survey for an ongoing study on ‘Enlarging incentive regulation to improve public awareness and 
trust in infrastructure development.16 
 
Respondent information 
Organisation: Click or tap here to enter text. 
Contact person: Click or tap here to enter text. 
Email: Click or tap here to enter text.   phone: phone: phone: Click or tap here to 
enter text. 
 
Survey questions 
Part A: Experience with activities like branding, communication, public relations and stakeholder 
engagement 
1. As an organisation, do you engage in one or more of the aforementioned activities?  
Yes ☐ /No ☐ 
If your answer to question 1 is yes, continue with question 2; if your answer is no, you can immediately 
go to question 6.  
2. Illustrate recent experience with branding 
 Click or tap here to enter text. 
3. Illustrate recent experiences with communication 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
4. Illustrate recent experiences with public relations  
Click or tap here to enter text. 
5. Illustrate recent experiences with stakeholder engagement (national or local authorities, 
NGOs, local associations, local population…) 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
6. What other activities, if any, are you engaged in and how much? Please give examples 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
7. Do you want to share anything else regarding the experience of your organisation with these 
activities? 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
 
Part B: Motivation 
8. Are these activities part of a corporate mission, strategy or culture? Please illustrate. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
                                                             
16 As the goal is to seek alignment of all stakeholders, ‘Incentive’ is to be understood here not only on TSOs, but 
may also be on authorities, NGOs, local population, citizens, i.e. to ‘nudge’ them.  
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9. Can you describe a past negative experience with an infrastructure project that you would like 
to avoid repeating? Can you list the reasons the project was crippled? How important was 
that project in terms of benefits for society? How big was the delay of those benefits? Please 
illustrate with monetary values if possible. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
10. Can you describe a previous positive experience with an infrastructure project that you would 
like to take inspiration from? Can you list the measures which supported the success? How 
large were the cost savings/benefits for your organisation? Please illustrate with numbers. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
11. Are there monetary or reputational incentives from the regulatory authority on your company 
to engage in the aforementioned activities? If yes, how large are they in absolute terms and 
compared to your allowed revenue? Please illustrate with numbers. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
12. Are there monetary or reputational incentives of any kind on other stakeholders key to the 
project (local authorities, other authorities, NGOs, local population…) to engage them in the 
aforementioned activities? If yes, can you describe them as specifically as possible. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
13.  Do you want to share anything else regarding the motivation of your organisation? 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
 
Part C: Organisational setup 
Budget and staff resources 
14. As an organisation, do you have a dedicated budget for the aforementioned activities?  
Yes ☐ / No ☐ 
15. If your answer to question 14 is no, how are the activities you do funded? Please illustrate 
with numbers. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
16. If your answer to question 14 is yes, how large are the budgets committed to these activities? 
Please illustrate with numbers and, if relevant, specify the budgets allocated for branding, for 
communication, for public relations and/or for stakeholder engagement. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
17. If your answer to question 14 is yes, what can you spend the related budgets on? Are there 
compulsory expenses or conversely forbidden actions? 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
18.  How does the budget for aforementioned activities compare to budgets for other business 
processes in your organisation? 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
19. How many staff are involved in the activities you undertake? Please illustrate with numbers 
and specify per activity if relevant. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
 
Organisational structure 
20. Are the resources for these activities organised centrally in a dedicated department or at 
project-level? Please illustrate. 
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Click or tap here to enter text. 
21. Are the resources for these activities used country wide or per region? Please illustrate. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
22. Are the skills and competences present in-house or brought in from outside the organisation? 
Please illustrate. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
23. Beyond resources from your company, are there other resources, possibly from other 
stakeholders, supporting the process? If yes, please describe them.  
Click or tap here to enter text. 
24. Is there a formal framework for these activities that you have to obey? Please describe the 
flexibility options you have in this respect; and the flexibility options you wish you had. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
25. Please list the main (kind of) stakeholders of your infrastructure project? Do/can/may you 
engage with all? What motivation do they have and what role do they play? 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
26. How do most influential stakeholders act on the project? Is it satisfactory from your 
perspective? Does it look satisfactory from these/other stakeholders’ perspective? 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
27. What measure would you recommend to incentivise on (or nudge) each and every 
stakeholders listed above, including, but not only, your company and local authorities? Please 
explain briefly why.   
Click or tap here to enter text. 
28. Conversely, what would you consider inappropriate incentives? Please explain briefly why. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
 
Tracking performance 
29. Does your organisation have KPIs concerning the aforementioned activities? Please illustrate. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
30. Besides monetary KPIs, what other indicators do you use? Please illustrate. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
31. Does your organisation involve the stakeholders in measuring these KPIs? Do you use 
stakeholder satisfaction surveys? Do you use expert assessments? Please illustrate. 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
 
32. Do you want to share anything else regarding the organisational setup for these activities? 
Click or tap here to enter text. 
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 Annex	II:	 Internal	workshop	for	ENTSO-E	members	18	October	2017	
 Workshop	report		Internal	 workshop	 on	 enlarging	incentive	 regulation	 to	 improve	public	awareness	 and	 trust	 in	 infrastructure	development	–	FSR	study	
 
18 October 2017, Avenue de Cortenbergh 100, 1000 Brussels 
 
Chair: Tomasz Okraszewski (Transnet BW), Sébastien Lepy (RTE) 
Moderators: Leonardo Meeus (FSR), Nico Keyaerts (FSR) 
Rapporteur: Nico Keyaerts 
 
Attendance  
ENTSO-E members, RGI and FSR 
 
Belgium Slovenia 
France Spain 
Germany  
 
 
Programme of the workshop 
 
• Welcome and EC Copenhagen Infrastructure Forum outcomes by Sébastien Lepy and Tomasz 
Okraszewski 
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• Outcomes of the FSR/ENTSO-E survey and revisiting incentive regulation by Nico Keyaerts and 
Leonardo Meeus  
• Brainstorm session moderated by Nico Keyaerts 
 
Observations in the survey concerning resources invested and presumed costs and benefits of 
stakeholder activities 
 
Out of the eleven TSOs that replied to the survey: 
- 3 indicated to have a staffing of less than 10 FTE; 5 indicated to have staffing of more than 20 (up 
to approximately 45) * 
- 6 indicated to have budgets in the range of a few million euro or 0-2 % of project budgets or 
general expenses budgets** 
*Caveat: survey respondents often indicated the numbers are best guesses as resources are dispersed 
in the TSO organizations (usually a mix centralized resources in corporate level departments and 
decentralized resources in regional and/or project based teams) 
** Caveat: budgets for compensation activities are treated separately 
 
Discussion: 
- One possible cost (benefit) estimate is redispatch costs that can be avoided by implementing the 
project as the saved redispatch costs can fully or partially pay for the project 
 
Introduction to brainstorm: revisiting incentive regulation (FSR preliminary thinking) 
 
A. Including the activities in incentive regulation 
Depending on the resources, skills and competences of the regulator and the TSO and depending on 
the assessment of a task as largely controllable, largely predictable and largely observable activities fit 
less or more with cost plus incentive regulation, price cap incentive regulation or output based 
incentive regulation.  
 
A.1 Including project-level stakeholder engagement activities in incentive regulation 
Arguments for price cap: often the default scheme, when there are no robust proxies to measure 
performance of project-level activities and sufficient if innovation of these activities resorts cost 
savings for the TSO 
 
Arguments for cost plus: some project-level stakeholder engagement activities are compulsory; it 
could be argued that the activity therefore is not sufficiently under control of the TSO 
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Arguments for output regulation: there are no obvious proxies for measuring the performance of 
project-level stakeholder engagement activities 
 
A.2 Including corporate level stakeholder engagement activities in incentive regulation 
Arguments for price cap: often the default scheme, sufficient if innovative corporate stakeholder 
engagement activities bring forth cost savings for the TSO 
 
Arguments for cost plus: there are weak arguments for cost plus as corporate level activities tend to 
be controllable, predictable and observable 
 
Arguments for output regulation: there exist proxies for some corporate level stakeholder 
engagement activities, e.g. brand value calculation methods, methods for sustainability rankings  
 
 
A.3 Including compensation activities in incentive regulation 
Arguments for price cap: often the default scheme and can be sufficient when TSO innovation in 
compensations brings cost savings for the TSO, e.g. the ELIA-RTE Life project focused on increasing 
biodiversity under overhead lines and the changed business processes lead to overall lower 
maintenance costs for the TSO 
 
Arguments for cost plus: compensations are sometimes regulated by dedicated laws and policies and 
the TSO executes those policies, passing through the costs 
 
Arguments for output regulation: there is no experience with proxies for performance of 
compensation activities 
 
A.4 Distortions of building block approach versus totex 
When different incentive regulation schemes coexist for different activities, there might be distortions 
when TSOs shift cost between activities; a totex approach in which all costs are treated the same 
remedies that distortion. 
 
B. Beyond the energy regulator: who are the regulators of these activities 
 
The skills and competences involved in these activities go beyond the traditional skills and 
competences of energy regulators. Several countries have experimented with involving other 
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government authorities, the public and NGOS, and independent experts to help regulate the TSO in 
the area of public awareness and trust in infrastructure building. 
 
B.1 Involving other regulators to assess what is a reasonable cost 
Environmental, planning and other government authorities set standards for stakeholder engagement 
in consent procedures (many EU countries), set frameworks for compensation payments that are 
executed by TSOs (e.g. Germany, France, Italy) 
 
The public contributes to willingness-to-pay studies for different compensations (e.g. Great-Britain) 
and to defining policies for compensation payments (e.g. farmer compensation in France) 
 
B.2 Involving other regulators to help drive down costs 
NGOs and TSOs co-create to innovate business process approaches (e.g. ELIA-RTE Life project to 
improve biodiversity) 
 
B.3 Involving other regulators to measure performance 
Independent experts provide external audits of sustainability performance of TSOs (e.g. Italian TSO is 
included in Dow Jones sustainability index) and evaluate stakeholder engagement strategies (e.g. 
Great-Britain stakeholder strategy graded by expert panel with score determining financial incentive) 
Brainstorm session 
 
Three questions were discussed: A/ what is the current experience with compensation activities for 
raising public awareness and trust in infrastructure development, B/ what is the framing used for 
compensation activities, and C/ how can the legitimacy of compensation activities be improved 
 
A. What is the current experience with compensation activities? 
The brainstorm brought to light three clusters of current compensation activities, which were 
compensations of affected individuals such as farmers and land owners, financial support to 
community projects, and compensations in the form of adjustments to the project design like 
undergrounding a section of the project. 
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B. What is the framing used for compensation activities? 
The discussion revealed that the current perception of compensation activities is that these activities 
are reactive, raise costs without a clear benefit and do not necessarily bring faster project 
implementation, e.g., when affected actors hold out to get more compensation. 
 
 
 
Discussing the framing of the compensation, it was argued that to take control of the framing, TSOs 
must better explain to the public the overall welfare improvement (highlighting a positive cost benefit 
analysis). TSOs should also highlight the inevitable trade-offs between different interests, and do the 
best possible consultation of the public. It was also argued that the link between the consultation 
process and the choice of compensation measures should be stronger. 
  
64 
 
 
 
Several practical do’s and don’ts to convince stakeholders to support a project were discussed: there 
have been positive experiences with early communication and with drawing attention to doing 
something good for the community. It is also important to sustain efforts. 
 
 
C. How can the legitimacy of compensation and other stakeholder activities be improved?  
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Brainstorming about the legitimacy (the moral right to do something) several criteria for improved 
legitimacy were discussed.  
- The public needs to trust the regulator(s) to take decisions in the interest of the public. 
- Stakeholders need to be involved; they need to be made aware of the importance of the projec 
and how compensation help the project and the public 
- There must be consistency in how the activities are done 
- TSOs need to work on what they stand for as the public might not know the TSO 
 
 
 
 
Workshop conclusions 
The challenge of raising public awareness and trust in infrastructure building is complex with many 
actors who have different perspectives. Simple solutions do not exist and to advance and innovate, 
open discussion among all stakeholders is necessary. 
 
The FSR study in collaboration with ENTSO-E and RGI, which was welcomed by the European 
Commission at the Infrastructure Forum in June 2017, is contributing to this debate by bringing 
together the different perspectives of actors and showing the ongoing innovation in the industry.  
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 Annex	III:	External	workshop	14	November	2017	
 Workshop	report		External	 Workshop	 on	 enlarging	incentive	 regulation	 to	 improve	public	awareness	 and	 trust	 in	 infrastructure	development	–	FSR	study	
 
14 November 2017, Avenue de Cortenbergh 100, 1000 Brussels 
 
Chair: Gerald Kaendler (ENTSO-E) 
Moderators: Leonardo Meeus (FSR), Nico Keyaerts (FSR) 
Rapporteur: Nico Keyaerts 
 
 
 
Attendance  
1/ per organisation 
TSO/ENTSO-E 12 NGO 2 
NRA/ACER 3 Academic 2 
EC 3  
 
2/ Geographical (location of interests) 
Germany 7 Belgium 2 
France 2 EU 4 
Independent 2 Transnational associations 5 
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Context of the workshop and FSR study in collaboration with ENTSO-E and RGI 
 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) study, in collaboration with ENTSO-E and RGI, on enlarging 
incentive regulation to improve public awareness and trust in infrastructure development was 
announced at and warmly welcomed by the Copenhagen Infrastructure Forum in June 2017. The 
Infrastructure Forum is looking forward at discussing the results and the possible need of regulatory 
changes at the next Infrastructure Forum meeting in 2018.  
 
 
Roundtable 1: Which activities are most important to improve public awareness and trust in 
infrastructure projects? 
 
Introduction: According to the ACER monitoring report on the progress of projects of common interest 
(PCI) about 1/3rd of electricity PCIs are delayed.17 Delays, as opposed to rescheduling, is for external 
reasons which often are directly or indirectly related to (limited) public support for the projects. It can 
be argued that public support issues are exogenous factors for project developers as many activities 
can be engaged in to raise public awareness and trust. Examples of these activities are project-level 
stakeholder engagement (info stands, public consultations, open houses, etc.), corporate level 
stakeholder engagement (branding, advertising, corporate social responsibility, social mission, 
education campaigns, etc.) and compensation activities (adjusting the project, financial payments to 
individuals, engaging in community projects, etc.).  
 
Polling results: 
Answer Summary 
Answer options ▲ 
‘project-level 
stakeholder 
engagement 
(e.g. info 
stands)’ 
♦ 
‘corporate 
level 
stakeholder 
engagement 
(e.g. branding)’ 
● ‘compensation activities’ ■   
Number of 
answers 
received 
6 4 5   
 
 
                                                             
17 ACER, 2017. Consolidated report on the progress of electricity and gas projects of common interest. Ljubljana, 
30 June 2017. 
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Discussion: 
On activities in general 
- In general, the activities are good, but engagement is predominantly reactive 
- Of 93 CEF actions about 1/3rd has element of public acceptance 
- Not only problem of TSOs also private project developers 
- Project and corporate level engagement first, but also compensation has value in bringing 
something real to affected community 
- It is about getting project done, consumers do not care about what activities help best 
- Examples discussed come from one part of Europe (note by rapporteur: the western/central 
European electricity system), something to keep in mind 
On project-level 
- Early and sustained engagement when you enter an area 
- Project-level is important as it is most targeted engagement to all specific stakeholders of a 
project, corporate level engagement might not be able to reach that variety of stakeholders 
On corporate level 
- Most TSOs face public acceptance issues, the problem seems somewhat less severe for TSOs that 
engage before they go in with a project 
- Not always clear what corporate level engagement brings to the table 
On compensation 
- Damage control should be last on mind 
- Not necessarily TSO approach, sometimes raised by politicians to just pay the farmers, the… 
- Paying off nimby not the way to go, compensations go to few people while costs go into tariffs for 
all consumers 
- Just adding money to a project is not a solution; you can make undergrounding the standard, 
multiplying the cost by 6-8 or use half that money to engage in a different way 
 
FSR wrap-up: the polling results and the debate confirmed that all three types of activities are relevant 
even if there are some differences in their ranking. Today, many project developers engage in some 
or all of these types of activities. Nevertheless, some corporate level activities are controversial (e.g. 
advertising or sponsoring activities) and compensations should rather come last to mind as it is the 
most controversial as it means redistributing wealth from the many to the few.   
 
 
Roundtable 2: What is the main obstacle for TSOs to engage in these activities? 
 
Introduction: ENTSO-E and FSR did a survey among European electricity TSOs to identify lighthouse 
examples. There were 11 replies (out of around 40 ENTSO-E members) from predominantly northwest 
European TSOs and a few central and eastern European TSOs. The survey collected some information 
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on the resources committed to stakeholder related activities both in terms of budgets and in terms of 
staffing; these resources are limited.  
 
Out of the eleven TSOs that replied to the survey: 
- 3 indicated to have a staffing of less than 10 FTE; 5 indicated to have staffing of more than 20 (up 
to appr. 45)* 
- 6 indicated to have budgets in the range of a few million euro or 0-2% of project budgets or general 
expenses budgets** 
*Caveat: survey respondents often indicated the numbers are best guesses as resources are dispersed 
in the TSO organizations 
** Caveat: budgets for compensation activities are treated separately 
The 2017 CMO/Deloitte survey on marketing budgets finds that the US energy sector (including 
utilities and including also oil and gas) spends on average 4% of its overall budget on marketing, which 
is a form of stakeholder engagement; much less than e.g. the 13% spent by mining companies, which 
is a B2B industry.18  
Notwithstanding the differences between Europe and the US, the imperfection of marketing budgets 
as a proxy for the wide range of activities discussed in the workshop and the particular role of grid 
operators in the industry, both surveys suggest that the resources invested in public awareness and 
trust building by the energy industry are fairly low.   
 
Polling results: 
Answer Summary 
Answer options ▲ 
‘limited 
economic 
incentives 
(financial 
risk)’ 
♦ 
‘legitimacy of 
activities 
(reputational 
risk)’ 
● 
‘TSO 
procedures, 
organization 
and culture’ 
■   
Number of answers 
received 4 3 6   
 
Discussion: 
On obstacles in general:  
- Are there other obstacles than these three? 
- There could be regional differences in the relative importance of the obstacles. The TSO landscape 
is diverse with large and small TSOs having to take on similarly large projects like PCIs  
                                                             
18  http://deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2017/01/24/who-has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets; last accessed 22 
November 2017 
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On limited economic incentives: 
- TSOs do experiment with innovative approaches, but the economic framework to move from 
pilots to established practice is not strong enough.  It is important to be consistent with all projects 
and e.g. think about the treatment of additional costs as OPEX when there is not an asset that is 
owned by the TSO. This OPEX is not always accepted, leaving the TSO with the higher cost of an 
activity that may have helped the project. 
- With limited budgets we need to balance different interests. E.g. if cables become the standard, 
benchmarking among TSOs will just mean the average cost has also multiplied by 6 or 8. 
On legitimacy of the activities: 
- Legitimacy for engaging in the activities has to come first to allow TSOs to change internally 
- Legitimacy is key for public acceptance as legitimacy means the people are in it together 
- Project developers are reluctant to pay landowners or to put a cable because those actions 
increase, even multiply, the costs. Raising the costs when not everyone agrees is the main 
challenge and it can only be done if there is legitimacy. 
- TSO operation would be easier if there was clarity on what can be done as activities and what is 
absolutely forbidden activities 
On TSO procedures, organization and culture: 
- The main obstacle is the practices employed by project developers in the field; economic 
regulation does not solve the problems if TSOs do not have the right background to engage with 
the public 
- TSOs and other project developers have sometimes operated for a long time in specific political 
regimes; they are now asked to enter in these innovative activities  
- TSOs have a legitimacy, a mandate to do certain things. Historically, TSOs have not been consumer 
centric. Consumers and other stakeholders want to be involved 
 
FSR wrap-up: the polling results and debate indicate that even though the relative importance of the 
three obstacles might differ, TSOs in practice face a combination of all three, with possibly regional 
differences. 
 
Some TSOs are engaged in transformational change of their processes, organization and culture (e.g. 
Elia, Eirgrid). In terms of legitimacy all stakeholders have a responsibility to explain their roles in the 
energy transitions, to explain why infrastructure projects are important, and to explain the public why 
higher costs are justified (e.g. paying for a community hospital) to get the project done (continued in 
roundtable 3). The economic incentives are further discussed in roundtable 4. 
 
 
Roundtable 3: Who are the most important regulators of these activities? 
 
Introduction: one dimension of legitimacy is the actors that ‘regulate’ the activities to raise public 
awareness and trust in infrastructure development. 
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Polling results: 
Answer Summary 
Answer 
options ▲ 
‘the 
energy 
regulator’ 
♦ 
‘environmental, 
planning and 
other 
government 
agencies’ 
● 
‘NGOs, the 
public and 
other 
stakeholders’ 
■ ‘independent experts’ 
Number of 
answers 
received 
6 9 3 0 
 
 
Discussion: 
General: 
- The case of Germany is unique as both the economic regulation and the planning authority are 
bundled in the national regulatory authority for energy 
- Different actors can help with regulating the TSO, meaning steering it in the right direction, but 
only if there is alignment; if regulators are not aligned they will kill the project instead of helping 
it 
- The NRA is for day-to-day, the government provides long term rules and NGOs and the public 
check 
- There are also different regulators at EU, national and local levels that need to be aligned  
On the energy regulator 
- In some countries the energy regulator will give an opinion on the network development plan 
assuming that the plan has the blessing of society; the regulator then expects the TSO to 
implement that plan 
On the environmental, planning and other government agencies:  
- It is important to get input from state representatives, to help steer actions. The costs of the 
activities are then a matter of the energy regulator 
On NGOs, the public and other stakeholders 
- There are some good experiences with combined planning and cost discussion involving NGOs; 
the government should be transparent about why certain projects are on a list for cabling and 
other projects not 
On independent experts 
- Independent actors can play a supportive role, but are not ‘regulators’ 
- In Germany there are good experiences with bringing in experts in moderating 
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FSR wrap-up: the polling and the debate indicate that the majority of stakeholders sees the energy 
regulator or state authorities as the main regulators, acknowledging a role for other actors in 
supporting regulation. 
 
In practice, other actors than the energy regulator are already involved to regulate the TSOs in the 
area of public awareness and trust building. Environmental, planning and other government 
authorities set rules for engaging with the public in permitting procedures and decide on financial 
compensation frameworks. NGOs, the public and other stakeholders are involved in studies on public 
willingness to pay for certain options in the project design, they co-develop policies for compensations 
and can help with innovation in areas where they more expertise (e.g. land maintenance). Also 
independent experts have been involved in regulating TSOs by evaluating stakeholder engagement 
strategy documents or auditing the sustainability performance of TSOs. 
 
 Roundtable 4: What is the best way to incentivize TSOs to engage in these activities? 
 
Introduction: Project developers are expected to engage with the public and the costs involved in 
those activities should be appropriately dealt with. The energy regulator then has to reflect on how to 
give economic incentives. There are roughly three approaches to incentive regulation: cost plus 
(accepting efficient costs to enter in the asset base plus a fair remuneration), price or revenue cap 
(mimicking competition by giving cost efficiency incentives), and output based regulation (often linked 
to quality and performance targets). 
 
The choice for one or the other can be seen as a trade-off involving the skills and resources of the 
regulator and the TSO and the assessment whether an activity is largely controllable, predictable 
and/or observable.  
 
Polling results: 
Answer Summary 
Answer options ▲ ‘cost plus’ ♦ ‘price cap’ ● ‘output regulation’ ■   
Number of answers 
received 
4 3 6   
 
Discussion: 
General: 
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- Price/revenue cap for opex and cost plus for capex, but projects were late or not done at all, new 
incentive introduced with extra money for timely completed strategic projects; to avoid cost 
overrun risk for the consumers, the budget is the one originally approved for the projects so a 
later change to cabling would not affect the incentive 
- Probably a mix works better, but simple cost plus to be avoided; on the other hand, if an activity 
increases benefits of the project it is an efficiently incurred cost and there will not be a problem 
- Permits often delayed because public opposition which is not controllable, not predictable, then 
cost plus is fair, but TSOs have many things under control like getting all documents ready on time 
- Different ways to incentivize the TSO, but we should avoid micro management  
- Involve the public in tendering different options, option 1 is 2 billion project and option 2 is 1.8 
billion but includes a hospital the community was missing; this will be an incentive for the public 
to support projects 
- The incentives should allow to experiment, incentive regulation for these activities is a trial-and-
error exercise, starting out with cost plus to eventually end up in output based once there are 
good performance indicators might be a sensible approach 
On cost plus 
- Cost plus is simplest, but if the problem is changing the TSO then offering the TSO board the 
opportunity to earn money will work better 
On output regulation 
- Output regulation risks to become a thick the box exercise, what is a good performance indicator 
besides just getting the project done 
- Output seems the best option, unless you get it wrong because then it is the worst option 
 
FSR wrap-up: the debate made clear there are no straightforward solutions and that also in incentive 
regulation there needs to be some room for trial-and-error to move up the learning curve for both the 
TSO and the regulator. 
 
Price cap might be sufficient for making TSOs engage in those activities that bring direct cost 
reductions for the TSO. Other activities may raise the cost for the TSO whereas the benefits of the 
project are reaped elsewhere in the energy system. In such cases output regulation can be the better 
option of a good performance indicator can be defined; if not, cost plus may be appropriate. 
 
Workshop conclusions 
 
The challenge of raising public awareness and trust in infrastructure building is complex with many 
actors who have different perspectives. Simple solutions do not exist and to advance and innovate, 
open discussion among all stakeholders is necessary. 
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The FSR study in collaboration with ENTSO-E and RGI, which was welcomed by the European 
Commission at the Infrastructure Forum in June 2017, is contribution to this debate by bringing 
together the different perspectives of actors and showing the ongoing innovation in the industry.  
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